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Out of Bounds: A Critical Race Theory
Perspective on 'Pay for Play'
Kevin Brown and Antonio Williams*
Under the amateur/education model, the amount of funding that colleges and
universities can provide to their student-athletes is limited to the athletes' cost of
attending their institution. This model makes sense for most college sports, but
National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") Division I Football Bowl
Subdivision and Division I men's basketball tend to generate almost all the revenue
to fund their institution's entire athletic programs-as well as a substantial
percentage of the revenues received by the NCAA. Furthermore is the realization
that a majority of the elite athletes in these two revenue-generating sports are black.
As revenues generated by these sports have escalated, a contentious debate has
raged for more than 30 years about the potential racial exploitation of the application
of the amateur/education model to these two sports. Both sides of this debate
tend to perceive the issue of racial exploitation in terms of dividing the revenues
between the athletes or the NCAA and its member institutions. Institutions either
receive more of the funds to use as they see fit, or more revenues are provided to
the athletes probably at the expense of the amateur/education model. This article
seeks to reformulate this debate by concentrating on the interests of the entire Black
Community, not just those of elite black male athletes. By examining the Black
Community's perspective, potential solutions to the enduring dilemma of racial
exploitation emerge. To counteract the charge that the amateur/education model is
potentially racially exploitive, the NCAA and its member institutions might institute
and fund massive programs that increase college attendance and graduation rates
for the entire Black Community. Admittedly, these programs would necessarily be
tailored in a manner that does not run afoul of the current interpretations of anti-
discrimination laws, but that is possible.
* Kevin Brown, JD, is the Richard S. Melvin Professor of Law at Indiana University; brownkd@
indiana.edu. Antonio Williams, PhD, is an associate professor in the School of Public Health at
Indiana University.
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1. Introduction
Historically, what defined college sports were the twin principles of its
identification with academic traditions and amateurism.' In other words, the
conventional view of the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") and
its member institutions is that athletic programs are a vital part of an institution's
educational mission and their athletes are essential members of their student body.
Further, amateurism holds that college athletes should not receive compensation
beyond expenses related to attending college to play their sport. As the NCAA
Constitution puts it, the participation of student-athletes:
Should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental
and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate
athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from
exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.2
Professor Timothy Davis terms this view of college athletic programs the
"amateur/education model."3 It is here where the NCAA rules find their sig-
nificance. Indeed, the primary purpose of the NCAA's labyrinthine rules is to
ensure that competition on the field is done on fair terms that are consistent with
its member institutions' shared commitment that athletes are both students and
amateurs.
If college sports is considered from the viewpoint of more than 460,000
student-athletes competing in the three divisions of the NCAA, then the am-
ateur/education model makes sense.' Since almost all of these athletes play in
competitions that generate little or no revenue for their academic institutions,
the primary beneficiaries of the competition are the participants. This reality is
also reflected in the fact that only about 20 of the Division I athletic departments
report a surplus when their entire athletic budgets are considered. However,
The NCAA's Principle of Amateurism states: "Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an inter-
collegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the
physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics
is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and
commercial enterprises." NCAA CONST. ART. 2.9.
2 NCAA CONST. ART. 2.9; see also 2015-16 NCAA DIVISIoN 1 MANUAL 3 (2015), httn://www.ncaa-
publications.com/productdownloads/D116.ndf.
3 Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and Conflicting Realities, 25
Rutgers L.J. 269, 270 (1994).
4 Student Athletes, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
5 The NCAA defines operating surplus in its biannual Revenues and Expenditures report to refer
to generated revenues (including donations) minus operating costs, where operating costs exclude
most capital expenses. See Daniel L. Fulks, REVENUES & EXPENSES: 2004-2014 NCAA DIVISION I
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS REPORT 11, 24 (2015), httns://www.ncaa.ora/sites/default/
files/2015%/`2oDivision% 201%20RE20report.pdf [hereinafter NCAA, Revenues and Expenses
2015]. Based on these calculations, the NCAA noted, "A total of 24 athletics programs in the FBS
reported positive net revenues for the 2014 fiscal year." Id. at 8.
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separate from the participatory sports are those that generate huge revenues
from the viewing public. Although there are variations at some educational in-
stitutions, the primary revenue-generating college sports are NCAA Division I
Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS football) and Division I men's basketball (men's
basketball).6 For example, during the fiscal year of July 1, 2016, to June 30, 2017,
at Indiana University-Bloomington, the men's basketball and football teams gen-
erated 98.2% of the allocated revenue from all sports teams.7 The net allocated
revenue from football was $11,412,804 and men's basketball was $11,705,810.
All other sports combined reported a loss of $21,090,498.9 For colleges and uni-
versities that field FBS football and men's basketball teams, the net profit from
these two sports provides a substantial portion of the athletic-related revenue
that is used to cover the expenses of all the other sports programs.0 In other
words, in addition to funding the expenses of the athletes in the revenue sports,
the funds they generate pay for escalating coaching salaries in revenue sports,
scholarships for non-revenue athletes, coaching expenses for non-revenue sports,
increased costs of athletic department staff members, updated athletic facilities
for all sports teams, luxury boxes at football and basketball stadiums for alumni,
donors, and dignitaries, and subsidizing university budgets." Men's basketball
is also the primary source for the revenue received by the NCAA. It owns the
marketing rights for the NCAA men's basketball tournament, from which the
6 Although other sports generate significant revenues for certain colleges and universities, the
two college sports that typically generate the largest revenues are FBS football and Division I
men's basketball. Throughout this article, mention of revenue sports refers only to these two
sports.
Total allocated revenue was $63,524,353 of which $24,560,829 came from men's basketball and
$37,085,787 from football. U.S. DEPT. OF EDUCATION, Indiana University-Bloomington, EQUITY
IN ATHLETICS DATA ANALYSIS, https://one.ed.aov/athletics/#/institution/details (last visited Feb. 4,
2018).
1 For basketball the net income was $11,705,810 ($24,560,829-$12,855,019) and for football it was
$11,412,804 ($37,085,787-$25,672,983). Id.
9 For sports other than men's basketball and football, the total allocated net loss was $21,873,304
($1,616,235-$23,489,539). Id. Thus, it could be asserted that the net profits from men's basketball
and football were used to provide the funds for all of the expenses of the other sports programs at
Indiana University.
10 For example, in fiscal year 2010, the FBS football programs earned a median of $3.1 million
more than revenue for the team. Division I men's basketball teams produced a median profit of
$788,000. But the medians for all other sports were net losses. See, e.g., Ahmed E. Taha, Are Col-
lege Athletes Economically Exploited? 2 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL'Y 69, 72 (2012); see also KNIGHT
CoMMISSIoN ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, COLLEGE SPORTS 101, CHAPTER 3: REVENUE (2009),
http://www.knightcommission.org/collegesportslOl/chapter-3.
" For instance, a 2015 press release announcing the dedication of Indiana University-Bloom-
ington's new Global and International Studies Building stated that the "new $53 million building
was funded entirely through university sources with half of the funding coming from IU's Big
Ten Network revenues, representing the largest-ever commitment from IU Athletics revenue to
support the core academic mission of the university." Press Release, IU to Dedicate Its New Glob-
al and International Studies Building, IU NEWSROOM, http://archive.news.indiana.edu/releases/
iu/2015/09/alobal-and-international-studies-buildin.shtml (Sept. 25, 2015).
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NCAA derives a substantial percentage of its operating funds. In fiscal year 2014,
for example, the NCAA's total revenues exceeded $1 billion with the majority
of those revenues, about $700 million, coming from television and marketing
agreements with CBS and Turner Broadcasting for the NCAA Tournament.12
Viewing the amateur/education model from the perspective of all athletes
playing at NCAA member institutions certainly makes sense. However, whether
the model (specifically the principal of amateurism) should apply to the athletes
in revenue sports is a different matter. This issue also resides at the heart of the
recent decision in Alston v. NCAA, where federal district court judge Claudia
Wilken, of the Northern District of California, struck down the NCAA rules that
limit compensation to players in these revenue sports, as an illegal restraint on
trade. 3 Similarly, civil rights historian Taylor Branch noted that the sentiment of
amateurism "blinds us to what's before our eyes. Big-time college sports are ful-
ly commercialized. Billions of dollars flow through them each year. The NCAA
makes money, and enables universities and corporations to make money, from
the unpaid labor of young athletes." 4
Added to these circumstances is the realization that the majority of the elite
athletes in revenue sports are black. Notably, in 2017, 44.2% of Division I foot-
ball players were black, but the percentage was higher at FBS schools, 55.9%.
As for men's basketball, black men made up 53.0% of the players. 6 In regards
to the Power Five Conferences-the Atlantic Coast Conference ("ACC"), Big
Ten Conference, Big 12 Conference, Pac 12 Conference, and the Southeastern
Conference ("SEC")-black males constituted only 2.5% of the undergraduate
students at these institutions, but they made up a much higher percentages of
the athletes in revenue sports, 56.3% of football players and 60.8% of the men's
basketball players. 7 As a result of this substantial over-representation of black
male athletes, critics often raise a potential charge that the application of the
amateur/education model to revenue sports is imbued with racial exploitation'
As ESPN reporter Kevin Blackstone put it, "One could clearly envision Black
12 Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Nearly Topped $1 Billion in Revenue in 2014, USA TODAY (Mar.
11, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/storv/sports/collee/2015/03/11/ncaa-financial-state-
ment-2014-1-billion-revenue/70161386/
13 Alston v. NCAA
14 Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, The Atlantic Magazine 80-103 (2011).
15 Richard Lapchick et al., Univ. Cent. Of Fla. Inst. for Diversity and Ethics in Sport, THE 2017




1 Shaun Harper, Univ. of Pa. Center for the Study of Race and Equity in Education, BLACK MALE
STUDENT-ATHLETES AND RACIAL INEQUITIES IN NCAA DIVISION I COLLEGE SPORTS 2016 EDITION 1
(2016), https://equity.ase.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Harer Sports 2016.pdf
1 See, e.g, Emma Kerr, The NCAA as Modern Jim Crow? A Sports Historian Explains Why She
Drew the Parallel, THE CHRONICAL OF HIGHER EDUCATION (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.chronicle.
com/article/The-NCAA-as-Modern-Jim-Crow-A/242240?cid=wb&utm source=wb&utm me-
dium=en&elaTrackld=6103a75a8c28482dbc6c8e89af0171a0&elg=b2f5156d29a34204b0dac-
Obl7e04b084&elqaid=17459&elqat=1&elqCamoaignld=7641 (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
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men as gerbils on a wheel that produce the financial energy for all intercollegiate
sports to survive and prosper."" More candidly, former legendary Louisiana
State University ("LSU") basketball coach Dale Brown stated, "Look at the
money we make off predominantly poor black kids, we're the whoremasters." 2 0
This criticism, unfortunately, is not new. It has been leveled at college sports
for more than three decades. One example is a 1986 article in the New Republic
titled, "Dunk and Flunk," where Malcolm Gladwell discussed the politics of race
on university campuses. Another is professor Gary Sailes's 1986 article titled,
"The Exploitation of the Black Athlete: Some Alternative Solutions." 21
According to a 2014 Marist Poll, however, many Americans don't believe
that race has anything to do with the fact that top college athletes in football and
basketball are not paid.22 The results of the poll showed that 17% indicated that
they saw no or very little legitimacy to the claim, while an additional 53% called
the assertion false. However, as anyone knowledgeable about the U.S. racial
scene might expect, there were significant differences based on the race of the
respondents. More than 60% of blacks, but only a third of Latinos and a quarter
of whites, believed that top college athletes are unpaid because many of these
athletes are black. 2 3 In addition, 53% of blacks but only 25% of whites believe
that these athletes should be paid for their time spent practicing, training, and
playing.24 The Washington Post reported results of a different poll in September
of 2017, which found that half of U.S. sports fans felt that a scholarship was
adequate compensation for college football and basketball players, with 41%
believing they should be paid more. 25 But, like the Marist Poll, there were sub-
19 HARPER, supra note 18, at 2.
2 Branch, supra note 15.
21 See, e.g, Norton, No Time for Classes, 4 CALIF. LAW 42, 46 (1984); Malcolm Gladwell, Dunk
and Flunk, 194 NEW REPUBLIC 13-15 (1986); Gary Sailes, The Exploitation of the BlackAthlete:
Some Alternative Solutions, 55 J. NEGRO EDUC. 439 (1986); see also Erik Jensen, Taxation, the
Student Athlete, and the Professionalization of College Athletics, 1987 UTAH L. REv. 35 (1987).
22 Race Impacts Decision Not to Pay College Athletes, Say More than Three in Ten, MARIST
POLL (Mar. 25, 2014), http://maristpoll.marist.edu/326-race-impacts-decision-not-to-pay-college-
athletes-say-more-than-three-in-ten/#sthash.WiVnkL81.dpbs. For a copy of the poll results, see
http://maristpoll.marist.edu/wp-content/misc/usapolls/usl40203/Sports/Complete%/`2OMarch%/`2O
2014%20USA%/20HBO%2OReal%20Sports Marist%20Poll%2OTables.ndf#naae=3; similar
results were also found in a Washington Post/ABC News Poll in 2014, see Alex Prewitt, Large




23 MARIST POLL, supra note 23.
24 MARIST POLL, supra note 23.
2 Pamela MacLean and Eben Novy-Williams, NCAA, Athletes Draw Questions from Judge
Over Pay for Play, Bloomberg (Jan. 16, 2018, 7:57 PM), https://www.bloombera.com/news/arti-
cles/2018-01-17/ncaa-athletes-draw-questions-from-jude-over-pav-for-play.
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stantial racial divides, with 54% of blacks as opposed to 31% of whites and 41%
of Hispanics believing the players should be paid.26
When those who believe in the amateur/education model face the issue of
whether the current system is racially exploitive, they must relate any shortcom-
ings in the current system to the failure of institutions to provide the athletes with
enough resources in order to have a realistic opportunity to obtain a valuable
four-year degree. For these believers, if there are any deficiencies in the current
compensation system, the solutions relate to colleges and universities doing more
to assure that their athletes graduate with meaningful degrees. But it is important
to note that the NCAA and its member institutions have taken several significant
steps over the past 35 years to increase the percentages of athletes graduating
with meaningful degrees. These measures have substantially improved gradua-
tion rates of all athletes, particularly black male athletes in revenue sports.
Additionally, either on its own initiative or as a result of the threat of anti-
trust litigation,27 the NCAA has repealed regulations that both limited athletic
scholarships to one-year renewable at the option of the institution and limited
the amount of the scholarships to amounts necessary to cover only tuition and
fees, room and board, and required course-related books (collectively known
as "grant-in-aid" amounts). Member institutions can now offer multi-year full
"cost-of-attendance" scholarships, ones that cover grant-in-aid amounts plus
miscellaneous expenses incurred when attending college such as laundry, en-
tertainment, and trips back and forth to home. Thus, under NCAA regulations
currently in place, Division I colleges and universities are free to offer their ath-
letes multi-year scholarships and ones that include an additional amount beyond
grant-in-aid figures to cover the miscellaneous expenses of attending college,
usually between $3,000 to $7,000.
Proponents of the amateur/education model applied to revenue sports must
reckon with the reality that conditions for athletes, both academically and finan-
cially, have significantly improved. There is also the possibility that there will
26 Will Hobson and Emily Guskin, Poll: Majority offBlackAmericans Favor Paying College




27 O Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 971 (N.D. Cal. 2014) rev. O Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d
1049 (9th Cir., 2015) cert. den. 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016). In this case, the District Court enjoined the
NCAA from limiting scholarships to grant-in-aid amounts for FBS football and men's basketball
scholarship athletes. Separate cases were originally filed former University of Nebraska quarter-
back Sam Keller and former UCLA basketball player Ed O'Bannon and merged into a single class
action lawsuit against the NCAA. The O'Bannon case began as an effort challenge the NCAA and
its member institutions rules that prevented athletes from receiving a share of the sale of licenses
to use the student athletes' names, images, and likenesses invideogames, live game telecasts, and
other footage. O'Bannon and 19 others filed a class action antitrust lawsuit against the NCAA,
arguing that the NCAA was wrongfully profiting from the sale of players' images and likeness-
es in the EA Sports video games without providing the athletes any compensation. The NCAA




come a time when colleges and universities reach the extent of their abilities
to ensure that their athletes have a realistic opportunity to receive a legitimate
four-year college degree. Nonetheless, the revenues generated by FBS football
and men's basketball are likely to continue to increase. For example, in 2012,
ESPN paid $5.64 billion for the broadcasting rights for the first College Football
Playoffs. 28 The Knight Commission reported that the combined revenue for the
Power Five conferences increased by 266% from 2005-15.29 In 2010, the NCAA
signed an $11 billion, 14-year agreement for the television rights for the NCAA
men's basketball tournament. This was a 41% increase over its prior deal. The
NCAA also reached an agreement for an eight-year extension in 2016 with CBS
and Turner in which the NCAA will receive an additional $8.8 billion.30 Moreover,
in the near future college sports may be able to take advantage of new revenue
streams from Internet platforms like Google and Amazon.3 ' Consequently, those
who find that the amateur/education model is not racially exploitive must contend
with whether they will maintain that view in 10 or 20 years when funds from
these sports continue to escalate and simultaneously there is little or no room for
improving academic achievement of black male athletes in revenue sports.
On the other hand, some believe the amateur/education model does not allow
athletes to receive enough compensation for their services. From this view, the
NCAA and its member institutions should provide or allow student-athletes to
receive more funds. Based on her decision in Alston v NCAA, Judge Wilken
clearly sympathizes with these individuals. Still, it is important to understand
that Judge Wilken's injunction does not mean that colleges and universities have
to provide compensation for their revenue-sports athletes beyond cost-of-atten-
dance scholarships. Rather, it means that those schools have the choice to decide
whether to do so, without violating NCAA restrictions.
Any college or university that decides to pay its revenue-sports athletes
beyond the cost-of-attendance scholarships must consider several potential legal
obstacles. To begin with, under the broad tax exemption provided by Internal
Revenue Code ("IRC") Section 501(c)(3), income generated by revenue sports
is exempt from taxation for colleges and universities because it is treated as
"substantially related" to a university's educational mission.32 If educational
institutions pay student-athletes in revenue sports, there is a stronger argument
that income generated by these "employees" is unrelated to the institution's ed-
ucational mission. If it is, that income would become subject to federal income
28 Rachel Bachman, ESPN Strikes Deal for College Football Playoff WALL STREET J. (Nov. 21,
2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB0001424127887324851704578133223970790516.
29 John Solomon, The History Behind the Debate Over Paying NCAA Athletes, ASPEN INS. (Apr.
23, 2018), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/history-behind-debate-paving-ncaa-athletes/
30 Rodger Sherman, The NCAA 's New March Madness TV Deal Will Make Them a Bil-
lion Dollars a Year, SB NATION (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.sbnation.com/college-basket-
ball/2016/4/12/11415764/ncaa-tournament-tv-broadcast-rights-money-pavout-cbs-turner.
31 Andy Staples, With Upheaval in Cable Market, Power 5 Bet on Silicon Valley to Keep
Rights Revenue Flowing, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 8, 2017), https://www.si.com/collepe-foot-
ball/2017/05/08/power-five-tv-rights-deals-amazon-oole (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
32 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
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taxes. For a number of other legal purposes, paying athletes also runs the risk that
students become employees. Such a determination carries with it various con-
cerns, including the following: federal income taxes, state income taxes, social
security and Medicare contributions by both the athletes and their institutions,
unemployment taxes, increased tort liability for colleges and universities through
the application of respondeat superior, and increased constitutional due process
protections for athletes at public colleges and universities. Educational institu-
tions must additionally comply with Title IX, which requires equal treatment of
the male and female athletes.
Beyond the aforementioned noted legal considerations are the practical
considerations of how to equitably compensate players? After all, shouldn't the
starting quarterback receive more than the third-string left guard? Or shouldn't
the leading basketball scorer receive more than the reserve defensive specialist?
Admittedly, there is less competitive balance in college sports than most sports
fans would like. For instance, as recently pointed out by Purdue University pres-
ident Mitch Daniels, in the five years leading up to the 2017-2018 season, 45%
of the "five-star" basketball recruits, and 58% of those who played for one year
before turning pro, have gone to just five schools.33 It has also become common-
place to cheer against the University of Alabama (maybe now Clemson) winning
another FBS football championship. But, the question remains, what happens to
the competitive balance that still exists in these college sports if the athletes are
paid to play? As previously noted, only about 20 athletic departments currently
generate more revenue than expenses. Therefore, the funds to pay athletes in rev-
enue sports is likely to reduce the ability of colleges and universities to maintain
non-revenue sports. Accordingly, proponents of the amateur/education model
must further reckon with the possibility that implementation of their approach
could lead to the dissolution of college sports as we know it.34
Both sides of the debate regarding whether the amateur/education model
applied to revenue sports is racially exploitive tend to follow the same path of
discussion that commentators have employed for 30 years. They view the issue in
terms of dividing the revenues between the athletes or the NCAA and its member
institutions. Either the institutions receive more of the funds to use as they see fit
or more of the revenues are provided to the athletes-probably at the expense of
the amateur/education model.
Raising the question about the possibility of the amateur/education model
applied to revenue sports being racially exploitive first requires an understanding
of the concept of race discrimination. The predominant legal definition of racial
discrimination requires that for it to exist, discriminatory intent must motivate
the actor's conduct. To prove discriminatory intent, more is required than an
33 Mitch Daniels, Daniels: Good Luck Fixing the Cesspool that is the NCAA, Condoleezza Rice,
INDY STAR (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.indystar.com/storv/opinion/2018/02/02/daniels-good-luck-
fixing-cesspool-ncaa-condoleezza-rice/302446002/
34 But see Jeffrey Standen, The Next Labor Market in Sports, 92 OR. L. REV. 1093 (2014) (arguing




awareness of the racial consequences of an otherwise neutral policy. The relevant
decision maker must adopt the policy at issue because of-not merely in spite
of-its adverse effects on an identifiable racial group.3 5 This is the definition of
racial discrimination contained in the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which applies to public colleges and universities because they are
governmental entities. It is also the definition used in lawsuits derived from Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that applies to all colleges and universities
because they receive federal funds. It is, moreover, the definition of race discrim-
ination under Section 1981, which applies to the NCAA and all of its member
institutions. The reality that the NCAA and its member institutions are aware
of the fact that black male athletes are generating the revenue that is benefitting
so many others is largely irrelevant, from the point of view of this definition of
racial discrimination. Few, if any, commentators would seriously contend that
the NCAA and its member institutions embrace the application of the amateur/
education model to revenue sports not in spite of, but because it disadvantages
black male athletes.
Beyond the predominant legal definition of racial discrimination, another
concept of racial exploitation is centered on a concept of race discrimination
not in terms of the motives of an actor, but the effects of the actor's conduct.
These negative effects may result in part from discriminatory intent, but they
may also result from unconscious racism, the use of stereotypes, or institutional
racism-specifically formal or informal structural mechanisms such as policies
and programs that work to systematically produce disproportionately negative
consequences on under-resourced minorities. It is from this latter viewpoint-
discriminatory effects-that issues about the racially exploitive nature of the
amateur/education model applied to revenue sports makes the most sense.
If the question regarding limits on compensation to FBS football and men's
basketball players is viewed from the point of view of its discriminatory effect,
then the concern should be about the impact on the entire Black Community, not
just elite black male athletes. This understanding allows us to recognize that the
issue of compensation of athletes in revenue sports is not limited to the NCAA
and its member institutions on one hand, and the athletes, on the other. But, the
Black Community has a separate interest at stake. By taking the perspective of
the entire Black Community, instead of the prevailing perspective limited to that
of elite black male athletes, a different view of the issue of racial exploitation and,
more importantly, potential solutions to combat the exploitation that is embedded
in the amateur/education model emerge.
If we see the issue of racial exploitation in terms of the entire Black Com-
munity, then potential solutions are not limited to simply deciding how to split
the funds produced by the revenue sports between the institutions or the athletes.
3 Pers. Adm r ofMass. v. Freeney, 442 US 256, 279 (1979). The Supreme Court has approved
the interpretation of the implementing regulations for Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act that
declared discrimination is barred "which has that effect even though no purposeful design is
present," citing Lau v. Nichols, 414 US 563, 568 (1974). However, inAlexander v. Sandoval, 532
US 275 (2001), the Court concluded that there is no private right of action under the implementing
regulations of Title VI.
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To counteract the charge that the amateur/education model is potentially racially
exploitive, the NCAA and its member institutions could institute and fund mas-
sive programs that would help to increase the college attendance and graduation
rates for the entire Black Community. To lessen the financial blow, those funds
could come from increases in revenue. The programs could not only assist blacks
that are currently on the campuses of Division I schools, but also help junior high
and high school students in predominately black school districts throughout the
country enroll in colleges and universities after high school. Admittedly, these
programs would have to be tailored in such a way as not to run afoul of the cur-
rent interpretations of anti-discrimination laws, but that is possible.3 6 We must
also trust that college and university administrators will not simply reallocate
athletic revenue and use it to replace funds currently spent on diversity programs.
The focus on this article is, therefore, on the issue of the potential racial
exploitation that exists when the amateur/education model is applied to revenue
sports. But it addresses this issue from the perspective of the Black Community
and focusing on ways to re-envision the role of race in college sports. College
sports have not always been a major commercial activity.
In 1984, the Supreme Court rendered its only antitrust opinion involving
college sports. Applying antitrust law, in NCAA v. Board ofRegents,3 7 the Court
ended the 33-year reign of the NCAA over the television rights to college football
games of its member institutions. At the same time, however, the Court accepted
the amateur/education model set forth by the NCAA as the basis of college sports
for antitrust purposes. By deregulating the control of the NCAA over member
institutions' television rights, the Court paved the way for substantial increases
in revenues generated by college sports, while it also limited the amounts college
athletes could receive. Section II of this article will discuss this Court opinion as
well as the rise of the business of college sports that the deregulation of television
rights helped to make possible. Given the limits placed on compensation for the
athletes, this savings has generated additional funds for an arms race involving
rapidly rising salaries for the best head coaches of revenue sports, extra funds
for athletic departments, and more money for sports facilities. Section II will
conclude by discussing this arms race.
Under the amateur/education model, the coaches of the football and basket-
ball teams have every right to try to get as much out of a player as possible. But, in
exchange, they should provide that player with every legitimate means necessary
to obtain a meaningful college degree. Section III will discuss several policies
and programs adopted and instituted by the NCAA and its member institutions
over the past 35 years that have significantly improved the chances that member
institutions will fulfill their part of the student-athlete/institution bargain. It will
also discuss some of the major legal obstacles that exist to paying athletes to
play beyond the cost of attending their institutions. As a result, substantial legal
36 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2792-3
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (race conscious measures
that do not employ individual racial classifications that further integrated schools do not trigger
strict scrutiny).
37 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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hurdles exist to abandoning the amateur/education model and paying athletes to
play, even as the NCAA is running out of room within the model to improve the
academic situation of the athletes competing in revenue sports.
Since this article is an attempt to conceptualize the debate regarding the po-
tential racial exploitation that comes from applying the amateur/education model
to the revenue sports, Section IV will look at the model from the perspective of
the Black Community. It will point to the long history of racial subordination
and the struggle against it that have produced a reality where the experiences of
individual blacks are connected to those of the Black Community. It will then
elucidate how revenue sports contribute to maintaining the most destructive
negative stereotypes that blacks encounter in their daily lives, including a lack
of intelligence and being prone to aggressive and violent behavior. Thus, the
experiences of and generated by black athletes in revenue sports are connected to
and influence the experiences of all those in the Black Community.
Finally, Section V will discuss a number of programs that the NCAA and its
member institutions could consider that would advance the college attendance
and graduation rates of the entire Black Community. This will help to counter
the continuing charge that the amateur/education model applied to revenue sports
is racially exploitive.
II. NCAA v. Board of Regents: The Rise of
the Business of College Sports
Throughout the 1970s, the idea that college sports was not a separate commercial
activity was deeply ingrained in higher education. This was a more innocent
time for college sports. Seventh Circuit Federal Judge Flaum succinctly put it this
way, this was "an era where recruiting scandals were virtually unknown, where
amateurism was more a reality than an ideal, and where post-season bowl games
were named for commodities, not corporations."38 At this time, the compensation
paid to college coaches fell in line with the overall university salary structure.
For example, legendary UCLA basketball coach John Wooden's Bruins won 10
NCAA titles between 1964 and 1975. His last title came in his last year of coaching
when UCLA paid him a salary of $40,000 per year.3 9 The head basketball coach
at Columbia University made the same as renowned Marquette basketball coach
Al McGuire.40 Barry Switzer, who won national college football titles coaching
the University of Oklahoma Sooners in 1974 and 1975, was making just $60,000
as late as 1984.1'
3 See Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1099 (Flaum J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
7th Cir. 1992).
39 Matthew Sable, Pay to Play: College Athletes Deserve Compensation, THE PITT NEWS (Mar.17,
2017), https://pittnews.com/article/117830/opinions/college-athletes-deserve-compensation/ (last
visited Feb. 2, 2018).
40 John Akers, Golden Era of Coaching: From 'Lefty' to 'Bones': Yesteryear Coaches were
Distinct Breed, NCAA (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.ncaa.com/news/basketball-men/arti-
cle/2012-03-26/golden-era-coaching.
41 Jerry McConnell, Raises Due for Switzer, Tubbs, DAILY OKLAHOMAN (Aug. 1, 1985), httv://new-
sok.com/raises-due-for-switzer-tubbs/article/2116590/?pace=1.
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Economist generally view the NCAA and its member institutions as a car-
tel maintaining the notion that athletes are amateurs and, thereby, limiting the
compensation they have to pay.42 The NCAA has also been referred to as the
best monopoly in the US. 43 Thus, it is important to understand that the most
likely legal avenue for significantly increasing the compensation paid to college
athletes is by having courts strike down NCAA regulations as restraints on
trade through antitrust litigation. Student-athletes who have challenged these
restrictions on antitrust grounds have largely failed because courts have tended
to uphold the NCAA's restrictions as justified because they provide two pro-
competitive benefits: (1) the preservation of amateurism in college sports, which
increases consumer demand and (2) the integration of academics and athletics,
which improves the college experience for student-athletes. This follows from
the 1984 Supreme Court opinion that rendered its only antitrust decision impact-
ing college sports, NCAA v. Board ofRegents. In this opinion, the Court struck
down the NCAA's 33-year control over college football televisions revenues. The
deregulation of television rights that occurred in this decision paved the way for
substantial increases in income generated by college sports. But the Court also
accepted the NCAA's amateur/education model. As a result, for purposes of anti-
trust litigation, the decision enshrined the concept of amateurism as a necessary
aspect of college sports and, thus, until the opinion of the district court inAlston
v. NCAA, eliminated antitrust law as a possible avenue in order to substantially
increase revenues for college athletes.
The first section of this part will discuss how the opinion in NCAA v. Board
of Regents paved the way for increased revenues derived from college sports
while simultaneously limiting the compensation of athletes in revenue sports. It
will also point to the substantial increases in revenues for college sports that has
occurred since the Court's opinion. In order to determine whether athletes play-
ing revenue sports are under-compensated, it is necessary to compare what they
receive to the value of the services they render. The second section will address
this comparison. Essentially, it will discuss the cost of a college education and
present a number of different ways to value the financial contribution of the ath-
letes playing in revenue sports to their institutions. Since the compensation that
athletes in revenue sports receives is currently limited, one of the consequences
is that there is more money to spend on coaches, athletic departments, and sports
facilities. The last section will discuss the increasing amounts of compensation
provided by member institutions to the head coaches of their revenue sports
teams, augmented budgets for their athletic departments, and more funding for
sports facilities.
A. NCAA v. Board of Regents: Paving the Way for Increased
Revenues While Limiting Athlete Compensation
In 1984, the Supreme Court rendered its only opinion applying the Sherman
42 See, e.g., Daniel Sutter and Stephen Winkler, NCAA Scholarship Limits and Competitive Bal-
ance in College Football, J. SPORTS AND ECON. 3, 5 (2003).
43 Id.
42 Brown, Williams
Antitrust Act to college sports in NCAA v. Board ofRegents.4 For the 33 years
prior to the Court's decision, the NCAA, not individual schools or conferences,
negotiated college football television contracts with the major television and
cable networks.45 The NCAA imposed strict limits on television appearances
of member institutions. It restricted the number of times a given school could
appear on television, set a minimum number of schools that had to appear at least
once, and determined a limit for the amount that each school would receive for
its televised appearances. The Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia, however,
challenged these NCAA restrictions under antitrust law as unreasonable
restraints on trade and the Supreme Court agreed.
In rendering its opinion, the Court accepted the model of college sports put
forward by the NCAA, which rests on the twin principals of the identification of
it with an academic tradition and amateurism. 46 In the opinion, the Court wrote:
[T]he NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football-college
football ... In order to preserve the character and quality of thfis]
"product," athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class,
and the like. And the integrity of the "product" cannot be preserved
except by mutual agreement; if an institution adopted such restrictions
unilaterally, its effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field might
soon be destroyed. Thus, the NCAA plays a vital role in enabling college
football to preserve its character, and as a result enables a product to
be marketed which might otherwise be unavailable. In performing this
role, its actions widen consumer choice-not only the choices available
to sports fans but also those available to athletes-and hence can be
viewed as procompetitive" (emphasis added).47
For the Court preserving college sports, built on the twin principles of am-
ateurism and connection to an academic institution, as something separate from
professional sports like minor league baseball or the National Basketball Associ-
ation ("NBA") G League (formerly the NBA Development League)48 made sense
44 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
45 The NCAA had not adopted any regulations to apply to televised athletic events, except for
football games. Id. at 88-9. The NCAA never controlled television contracts for college basketball,
except for its own NCAA basketball tournament.
46 Id. at 101.
47 Id. at 101-2.
48 The NBA created the D-League in 2001. Beginning in the 2017-18 season, it was renamed
the G-League as part of a multi-year sponsorship by Gatorade. Players who play in Europe can
start as high as $100,000 and often also receive living expenses. See, e.g., Darren Heitner, NBA
D-League vs. European Basketball: Why Don't More Players go to Europe, Sports Agent Blog
(July 30, 2012), http://sportsagentbloa.com/2012/07/30/nba-d-league-vs-european-basketball-
why-dont-more-plavers-ao-to-europe/; see also Dennis Hui, Unionizing the NBA G League, 25
SPORTS LAWYERS J. 119 (2018). Also, starting in the summer of 2019, the G League will offer elite
prospects that are 18 years old and, thus, too young to play in the NBA, $125,000 per year. The G
League will target the "one-and-done" college players. See Johnathan Givony, G League to Offer
$125K to Elite Prospects as Alternative to College One-and-Done Route, ESPN (Oct. 24, 2018),
http://www.espn.com/nba/storv/ /id/25015812/a-leaaue-offer-nrofessional-path-elite-prospects-
not-wanting-go -one-done-route-ncaa.
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from the perspective of an antitrust challenge because doing so provides both
consumers and athletes with more options from which to choose to occupy their
time, effort, and money.
In rendering its decision to eliminate the NCAA's control over television
rights, the Court paved the way for dramatic increases in broadcasting and other
revenues for colleges and universities with big-time sports programs. Simultane-
ously, in furtherance of the idea that college sports should be distinguished from
professional sports, the Court allowed the NCAA and its member institutions to
strictly limit the compensation of the athletes responsible for producing these
increased revenues. In other words, up until the decision in Alston v. NCAA, the
federal courts interpreted NCAA v. Board of Regents to foreclose the possibility
that antitrust litigation would succeed in providing student-athletes in revenue
sports a means to realize a substantial share of the increased revenues that started
to flow to member institutions and the NCAA, in part, as a result of the Court's
deregulation of televised broadcasting rights for college sports.
Since the Supreme Court's opinion in Board ofRegents, college sports have
become not just "big business," but a massive business industry. Collectively,
the annual revenue from FBS football and men's basketball is over $7 billion."
These revenues exceed those of the English Premier Soccer League, the NBA,
and the National Hockey League ("NHL").o They make college sports the third
most lucrative sports industry in the world behind only the National Football
League ("NFL") and Major League Baseball ("MLB").5 ' Technological advances
in programing distribution, such as improved over-the-air television broadcast-
ing, expansion of cable television systems, and creation of satellite and Internet
broadcasting, have increased the ability of the viewing public to see college
sports games and, thus, provided the basis for substantially increased revenues.
To get a sense of how much more revenue college sports generates today than
when Board of Regents was decided, we can look at the television contracts
executed by the NCAA that were the subject of that litigation. The NCAA had
four-year television agreements with ABC and CBS that ran through the 1985
season, with each network paying a minimum of $131.75 million for broadcasting
at least 35 games each year. In addition, there was a two-year, $18 million deal
with Turner Broadcasting. Thus, the average annual television revenues for all
college football games televised were approximately $75 million.52 According to
an article by Paula Lavigne of ESPN.com, in 2015 the Power Five conferences
49 Travis Waldron, A Trip to the Men's Room Turned JeffKessler into the NCAA's Worst
Nightmare, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.huffinatonpost.com/entrv/jeffrev-kes-
sler-ncaa-lawsuit us 59723f33e4b00e4363df3f59.
SO Steven Kutz, NFL Took in $13 Billion in Revenue Last Season-See How It Stacks Up Against
Other Pro Sports Leagues, MARKETWATCH (July 2, 2016), https://www.marketwatch.com/storv/the-
nfl-made-13 -billion-last-season-see-how-it-stacks-up-aainst-other-leagues-2016-07-01.
51 Id.
52 Linda Greenhouse, N.C.A.A. Plea in High Court; Controlling TVFootb all at Stake, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 18, 1983), http://www.nytimes.com/1983/10/18/sports/ncaa-lea-in-high-court-controline-tv-
football-at-stake.html http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
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alone received $1.4 billion from selling TV rights.53
USA Today's annual college revenue from sports breakdown in 2016-17
showed that the University of Texas topped the list, producing over $215 million
in revenue, followed by Texas A&M at nearly $212 million. These Texas schools
were followed by Ohio State, Michigan, Alabama, Georgia, and Oklahoma, all
of which bring in over $150 million in annual revenue. There were 30 public
universities on the list-more than double the amount from 2013-whose athlet-
ic department revenues exceed $100 million.54 More than 50 public universities
reported revenues from their athletic departments in excess of $50 million.5 5
As further evidence of the escalating proceeds generated by college sports,
the median generated revenue of the FBS football programs increased by more
than 160% between 2004 and 2014, to $21.7 million, and for men's basketball it
increased by almost 45% over that time, to $5.8 million.56
The NCAA has also reaped huge benefits from increasing college sports
revenues. The vast majority of the NCAA's revenues come from the operation of
the NCAA men's basketball tournament. The first one was held in March of 1939
and lost money.57 In 1985, the NCAA received $31 million from the television
rights for the NCAA Tournament.58 However, as previously mentioned, in 2010
it signed a 14-year, $11 billion deal for the broadcasting rights to the NCAA
53 Paula Lavigne, Rich Get Richer in College Sports as Poorer Schools Struggle to Keep Up,
ESPN (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.espn.com/espn/otl/storv/ /id/17447429/power-5-conference-
schools-made-6 -billion-last-vear-gan-haves-nots-grows (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
54 NCAA Finances 2016-17: Top School Revenue, USA TODAY, http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/fi-
nances/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2019) (the annual survey only tallies the 230 public Division I schools;
private colleges and universities are excluded). Amounts used were Total Revenues-allocated rev-
enues. Allocated revenues are not generated by the athletic department, but include student fees,
expenses paid for by the schools, and state and local government money provided to athletics.
5 Id. While the revenues that sports generate for colleges and universities are significant, they do
not rival the amounts from professional sports teams. For example, annual revenues of NFL foot-
ball teams range from the Dallas Cowboys' $560 million to the Oakland Raiders' $244 million.
Kurt Badenhausen et al., Cowboys Are the First U.S. Team to Top $3B Valuation, FORBES (Aug. 20,
2014), http://www.forbes.com/nfl-valuations/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2018). Annual revenues for NBA
teams range from the $293 million for the Los Angeles Lakers to $110 million for the Milwaukee
Bucks. Kurt Badenhausen et al., Lakers Top 2015 List ofNBA 'sMost Valuable Teams; Average
Franchise Is Now Worth Record $1.1 Billion, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
kurtbadenhausen/2015/01/21/average-nba-team-worth-record-1-1-billion-2/
56 The NCAA defines operating surplus as generated revenues, including donations, less oper-
ating costs, where such costs excludes most capital expenses. See Daniel L. Fulks, NCAA, REVE-
NUES & EXPENSES: 2004-2014 NCAA DIVIsIoN I INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS REPORT 11,
27 (2015), http://www.ncaa.or/sites/default/files/2015%/`2ODivision% o20I% /20RE%/20report.pdf
See Joseph N. Crowley, In the Arena: The NCAA 's First Century 31 (NCAA 1st ed. 2005) ("It
was held in March that year, minus the madness ... [i]t produced a loss of $2,531.").
5 James V. Koch, The Economic Realities ofAmateur Sports Organization, 61 IND. L.J. 9, 14
(1985).
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Tournament. 9 In fiscal year 2014, the NCAA's total revenues exceeded $1 billion,
with the majority of those revenues, about $700 million, coming from television
and marketing agreements with CBS and Turner Broadcasting for the NCAA
Tournament. 6 0 Most of the other revenue generated by the NCAA is also tied
to the NCAA Tournament, including ticket sales to live games. Of course, the
NCAA distributes a significant portion of its revenues to its member schools and
conferences, including, for example, $547.1 million given to Division I schools
and conferences from 2014 revenues. 61 In 2016, the NCAA signed an eight-year
extension agreement with CBS and Turner for the television rights for the NCAA
Tournament, taking it through 2032. As part of the extension, the networks agreed
to increase the amount the NCAA receives by an additional $8.8 billion. 62 The
NCAA's net assets also doubled between 2006 and 2012 to over $566 million.6 3
The NCAA also had a surplus in 2014 of nearly $80.5 million.64 This increased
NCAA assets to almost $708 million.6 5 But the NCAA incurred significantly
more expenditures in 2016, $1.4 billion, which dropped its total assets down to a
little under $300 million.6 6
B. Are College Athletes in Revenue Sports Undercompensated?
Before 2015, NCAA rules limited the amount of athletic scholarships to the
cost of tuition and fees, room and board, and required course-related books.6 7
These "grant-in-aid" amounts never covered the full "cost of attending"
college, because they did not include funds for miscellaneous expenses such as
incidentals, laundering clothes, books not required for courses, entertainment,
and transportation, including for trips to and from the athlete's permanent
residence. These additional amounts are determined based on the cost of living
at a given school's location and are, therefore, calculated by the financial aid
59 Thomas O'Toole, NCAA Reaches 14-Year Deal with CBS/Turner for Men's Basketball Tourna-
ment, Which Expands to 68 Teams for Now, USA TODAY (Apr. 22, 2010), http://content.usatodav.
com/communities/campusrivalrv/post/2010/04/ncaa-reaches-14-vear-deal-with-cbsturner/1#.
WmTUmmdEAoJ.




62 Sherman, supra note 31.
63 See Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Had Record $71 Million Surplus in Fiscal 2012, USA TODAY (May
2, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/storv/sports/college/2013/05/02/ncaa-financialstatement-sur-
plus/2128431/
64 See Berkowitz, supra note 61.
65 Id.
66 See Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Incurred $1.4 Billion in Expenses in 2016, USA TODAY (Mar. 7,
2017), https://www.usatoday.com/storv/sports/collee/2017/03/07/ncaa-incurred-14-billion-in-ex-
penses-in-2016/98856520/
67 O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 971 (2014).
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officers who use their professional judgement under the authority of the U. S.
Department of Education.68 Thus, the amounts for miscellaneous expenses
vary from one institution to the next. However, commentators have generally
estimated the average of these expenses at between $3,000 and $6,000.69 Now,
institutions are free to offer athletic scholarships up to the cost of attendance.
The first year the NCAA member institutions could offer cost-of-attendance
scholarships, the Power Five Conferences agreed to do so.70 A number of other
non-Power Five Conferences have followed this example, including the Mid-
American Conference, the Horizon League, the Big South, and schools including
the College of Charleston and Towson University.7'
To determine whether athletes in revenue sports are underpaid, it is neces-
sary to first establish how much they receive. Since the athletes' compensation
is limited to the cost of attending their universities, the place to start is how
much it costs to attend college. According to the 2018 college pricing report by
the College Board, the average 2018-19 academic cost of tuition and fees, and
room and board at four-year public institutions is $21,370 for resident (in-state)
students and $37,430 for non-resident students. The average was $48,510 for
private nonprofit four-year institutions. 72 To approximate the amount of a full
cost-of-attendance scholarship, we need to add the cost of textbooks for courses
and miscellaneous amounts. We should add an additional $2,000 for books and
miscellaneous amounts between $3,000 and $7,000. Thus, the range of cost of
attending a Division I college or university would run between approximately
$23,370 and $57,510. However, these amounts may overstate the cost of attending
the college of one's choice because higher education institutions often discount
tuition and fees. 73 Separate from the cost reported by colleges and universities to
attend their institutions, the results of a 2016 survey of NCAA Division I schools
showed that the average athletic scholarships for men's basketball was $38,246
and for FBS football it was $36,070.74
68 Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Increases Value ofScholarships in Historic Vote, USA TODAY (Jan. 17,
2015), https://www.usatoday.com/storv/sports/college/2015/01/17/ncaa-convention-cost-of-atten-
dance-student-athletes-scholarships/21921073/.
69 Michael McCann, Stakes and Stakeholders in Alston v. NCAA, the Latest College SportsAn-
titrust Case, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 2, 2018), https://www.si.com/colleae-football/2018/09/04/
alston-v-ncaa-trial-news-updates-ncaa-cost-attendance.
71 Jake New, Autonomy Arrives at the NCAA, INSIDE HIGHER EDUCATION (Jan. 19, 2015), https://
www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/01/19/power-five-leagues-expand-athletic-scholarships-cov-
er-full-cost-attendence (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
71 For a reference on the Mid-American Conference, the Horizon League, and the Big South
Conferences see Adam Epstein and Paul M. Anderson, The Relationship Between a Collegiate
Student-Athlete and the University: An Historical and Legal Perspective, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
287, 293 (2016).
71 COLLEGE BOARD, TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2018, 9 tbl.1 (2018), https://trends.collegeboard.
org/sites/default/files/2018-trends-in-college-pricing.pdf.
73 According the College Board, the discounts for public four-year institutions for resident stu-
dents is about $6,500 and for private nonprofit four-year institutions it is $21,220. Id at 18-19.
7 Average Athletic Scholarship per Varsity Athlete, SCHOLARSHIP STATS, http://www.scholarship-
stats.com/averaae-per-athlete.html (last visited January 21, 2019).
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There are a number of different ways to try to determine the value of college
athletes in revenue sports to their institutions. One way is to draw comparisons
with the compensation of professional athletes. Unlike college athletes, both
NFL and NBA players have unions to represent their interests and negotiate
with the owners on their behalf. Under the current NFL collective bargaining
agreement ("CBA") that runs through the 2020 season, the players receive a
minimum of 47% of league-wide revenue.75 The NBA players receive a 50-50
split of basketball-related revenue under the terms of their 10-year CBA signed
in December 2011.76 Yet, if you take the 2014 average revenue for an FBS football
program of 21.7 million and divide it by 85 scholarship athletes you come up to
over $255,000 in revenue generated by each athlete. Since NFL players receive at
least 47% of the revenue, if college football players received a similar percentage
they would each receive approximately $127,000 per year. As for men's basket-
ball, the corresponding average revenue for the 13 scholarship basketball athletes
is $446,000. At the NBA collective bargaining percentage of 50%, they would
receive on average $223,000 per year.
Ramogi Huma and Ellen J. Staurowsky77 conducted a collaborative study
between the National College Players Association and Drexel University's
Sports Management program of the amateur/athlete model. They concluded that
the market value for big-time college football and men's basketball players is
$137,357 and $289,031, respectively.78 Recently, Richard Borghesi, an associate
professor of Finance at the University of South Florida, conducted a study ofFBS
football recruits in which he concluded that five-star players would be entitled to
an additional $799,000 per year, four-star players an additional $361,000, three-
star players an additional $29,000, and two-star players an additional $21,000.79
Examining the numbers suggests that there is a plausible argument that the
players of revenue sports are generating far more revenues for their institutions
than the compensation they receive from them. The average range for how much
their financial compensation is from their Division I institutions is somewhere
between approximately $23,370 for athletes who are receiving grant-in-aid
scholarships to attend their in-state public universities to about $57,510 for those
receiving cost-of-attendance scholarships at private institutions. Conversely,
7 Gary Myers, NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement Includes No Opt-Out, New Revenue Split,
Salary Cap, Rookie Deals, DAILY NEWS (July 26, 2011), htto://www.nvdailynews.com/sports/
football/nfl-collective-bargaining-agreement-includes-no-opt-out-new-revenue-split-salary-cap-
rookie-deals-article-1.162495.
7 See NBA, CBA 101: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 2011 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION AND THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION (2012),
http://www.nba.com/media/CBAO1 9.12.pdf.
77 Ramogi Huma is the president, National College Players Association, and Ellen J. Staurowsky,
EdD, is a professor of sport management at Drexel University.
7 Ramogi Huma and Ellen J. Staurowsky, THE $6 BILLION HEIST: ROBBING COLLEGE ATHLETES
UNDER THE GUISE OF AMATEURISM 12 (2012), available at http://assets.usw.ora/ncpa/pdfs/6-Billion-
Heist-Study Full.vdf
79 Richard Borghesi, Pay For Play: The Financial Value ofNCAA Football Players, 49 APPLIED
ECONOMICS 46, 57 (2017).
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various attempts to determine the value of athletes playing revenue sports places
that value at amounts beyond the scholarships they receive.
C. Financial Consequences of Not Paying Athletes Have
Benefited Their Coaches and Athletic Administrators
Freed from the need to provide additional compensation to student-athletes in the
revenue sports, the amounts colleges and universities spend on other parts of their
athletic sports programs have exploded. And this arms race is continuing."o Over
the past 45 years, salaries that colleges and universities pay to their successful
coaches in revenue sports have skyrocketed. Economist theorize that college
coaches are overcompensated because athletes are not paid."' The highest paid
state official in 39 of the 50 states is an FBS football or men's basketball head
coach.82 The average salaries for the 44 head football coaches in the NCAA Bowl
Championship Series increased from $273,300 in 1986 to $2,054,700 by 2013,83
while over the same time the cost of living only doubled." The compensation for
successful coaches has likewise climbed sharply. Compared Wooden's $40,000
salary to that of recently fired UCLA head basketball coach Steve Alford, who
earned $2.6 million. 5 The annual salary paid by the University of Oklahoma to
its head football coach has increased from the $60,000 paid to Barry Switzer to
8" The "arms race" metaphor comes from KNIGHT COMMISSION, A CALL TO ACTION RECONNECT-
ING COLLEGE SPORTS AND HIGHER EDUCATION (2001), http://www.knightcommission.org/images/
pdfs/2001 knight report.pdf. See also Alfred Dennis Matthewson, Exploring the Commercialized
Arms Race Metaphor, in REVERSING FIELD: EXAMINING COMMERCIALIZATION, LABOR, GENDER, AND
RACE IN 21ST CENTURY SPORTS LAW 34, 35 (Eds. Andr'e Douglas Pond Cummings & Anne Marie
Lofaso, 2010).
81 See Patrick McLaughlin, College Football Players, Not Coaches Deserve to Be Paid, NEWSDAY
(Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.newsday.com/opinion/oped/collese-football-lavers-not-coaches-de-
serve-to-be-paid-1.11301251.
82 Cork Gaines, The Highest-Paid Public Employee in 39 U.S. States is Either A Football or
Men's Basketball Coach, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 22 2016), htto://www.businessinsider.com/us-
states-highest-paid-public-emoloyee-college-coach-2016 -9/#10 -pennsylvania--james-franklin-44 -
million-1. The states where this was not the case were Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Mon-
tana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Vermont. For a list
of the highest paid person in each state, see Evan Comen et al., The Highest Paid Public Employee
in Every State, 24/7 WALL STREET (Sept. 20, 2016), http://247wallst.com/special-report/2016/09/20/
the-highest-paid-public-employee-in-every-state/2/
83 See Marc Edelman, The Future ofAmateurism After Antitrust Scrutiny: Why a Win for the
Plaintiffs in the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation Will Not Lead to the
Demise of College Sports, 92 OR. L. REV. 1019, 1032 (2014).
84 U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS CONSUMER PRICE INDEX CALCULATOR, https://
www.bls.gov/data/inflation calculator.htm.
85 Sable, supra note 40.
4)-
JLAS 29-1 * 2019 49
the over $5 million to be paid to Lincoln Riley.86 In fact, the compensation of the
most successful head coaches in revenue sports has reached amounts nearly as
high as those for Fortune 500 CEOs." According to USA Today, the highest paid
college basketball coaches in 2018 were Duke's Mike Krzyzewski (nearly $9
million), Kentucky's John Calipari (nearly $8 million), Ohio State's Chris Holman
($7.15 million), Kansas's Bill Self ($4.95 million), and Michigan State's Tom Izzo
($4.36 million)." According to USA Today, Nick Saban, the head football coach
at the University of Alabama, is the highest paid head football coach, receiving
$8.3 million per year, 9 while Ohio State's Urban Meyer (now retired) earned $7.6
million, Michigan's Jim Harbaugh $7.5 million, and Texas A&M's Jimbo Fisher
$7.5 million, while Auburn's Gus Malzahn, Georgia's Kirby Smart, Clemson's
Dabo Swinney, and Florida's Dan Mullen all earned more than $6 million.90
The increases in expenditures for college sports do not stop with head
coaches in revenue-generating sports. Will Hobson and Steven Rich noted that
between 2004 and 2014 non-coaching payrolls of the athletic departments of the
48 schools in the five wealthiest conferences increased from $454 million to $767
million, a 70% increase in a decade.9 ' Athletic departments also have more funds
to spend on sports facilities. In 2014, one in five Division I athletic directors said
their departments planned on spending more than $50 million on facilities in the
next five years.9 2
86 Kalen Jones, Oklahoma, Lincoln Riley Agree to Contract Extension, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan.
1, 2019), https://www.si.com/colleae-football/2019/01/01/oklahoma-lincoln-riley-contract-exten-
sion-aaree.
1In 2012, the average CEO of the largest U.S. companies earned $12.3 million. Jennifer Liberto,
CEOsEarn 354 Times More Than Average Worker, CNN MONEY (Apr.15, 2013), http://monev.cnn.
com/2013/04/15/news/economy/ceo -pay-worker/.
NCAA Salaries: Top NCAAB Coach Pay, USA Today, http://sports.usatodav.com/ncaa/salaries/
mens-basketball/coach/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
89 NCAA Salaries, USA TODAY, http://sports.usatodav.com/ncaa/salaries/ (last visited Jan.18,
2019). Another article also reported that Nick Saban was the highest paid college football coach,
receiving over $11 million a year from the University of Alabama. Indeed, Saban's salary means
that he makes more than all NFL coaches even though the Alabama football program produces
less than one-third the income of any NFL team. Will Hobson and Emily Guskin, Poll: Majority




90 NCAA Salaries, USA TODAY, htto://sports.usatodav.com/ncaa/salaries/ (last visited Jan.18,
2019).
91 Will Hob son and Steven Rich, As College Sports Revenues Spike, Coaches Aren't Only Ones
Cashing In, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2015), https://www.washinatonpost.com/sports/as-collee-
sports-revenues-spike-coaches-arent-only-ones-cashin-in/2015/12/29/bbdb924e-ael5-11e5 -9abO-
884d1cc4b33e story.html?utm term=.95dc946f7650 (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
92 Kevin Trahan, 84 Percent OfColleges to Spend More On Sports Facilities, Per Survey,




Ill. Limits of and Obstacles to Abandoning the
Amateur/Education Model
When speaking about football players, legendary Ohio State head coach Woody
Hayes succinctly summarized the quid pro quo of the amateur/education model.
The coach will squeeze every bit of football from each player that he can,
but in return the coach must give that man every legitimate measure of
help he needs to get 'the rest' of his education. ... [W]e feel that the man
who plays college football and does not graduate has been cheated.93
Under this model, the maximum obligation of the institution to the athlete is
to provide scholarships to cover all costs related to pursuing a four-year academic
degree and the academic support necessary to give athletes a realistic opportu-
nity to obtain that degree.
For black athletes in the revenue sports, during the time Hayes was patrolling
the sidelines at Ohio State, his view of college sports was more the exception than
the rule. For example, a 1982 article in the Sporting News revealed that only 50%
of seniors regularly playing basketball in seven major conferences graduated with
a degree, and in the Southwest Conference the figure was only 17%.'9 A survey
during the 1980s of 100 Division I basketball and football programs showed that
at 35 of the schools the graduation rate for male basketball players was under
20% and the same was true at 14 of these institutions for football players.9 5 No
doubt if the academic performance of black male athletes were separated out, the
figures would be lower. In "Dunk and Flunk," Gladwell pointed out that only one
fourth of the nation's black male athletes in major college sports graduated from
college and 75% of them had degrees in physical education.96
Sometimes responding to public criticism, sometimes under the threat of
litigation, and sometimes based on its own initiatives, the NCAA and its member
institutions have made tremendous strides toward improving both academic
achievement by students in revenue sports and increasing the value of their
scholarships over the past 35 years. While there is still much to be done to make
the promise of a genuine opportunity for a meaningful college degree an absolute
reality, the NCAA and its Division I member institutions have traveled a long
way down this road.
The first subsection of this part will discuss a number of changes instituted
by the NCAA to increase academic requirements for entering high school stu-
dents who are playing college sports. These increases had a special impact on
those student-athletes in revenue sports. These increased requirements helped
to ensure that more prospective high school athletes are academically prepared
93 Woody Hayes, You WIN WITH PEOPLE! 12 (2d ed. 1975).
94 Norton, supra note 22.
95 See Douglas Lederman, College Athletes Graduate at Higher Rate Than Other Students, But
Men's Basketball Players Lag Far Behind, Survey Finds, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 27, 1991,
at Al.
96 Gladwell, supra note 22.
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for the rigors of college study. The NCAA also instituted progression towards
degree requirements to make sure that once student-athletes are enrolled they are
making progress toward graduation.
The second subsection covers the adoption of the Academic Progress Rate.
This measure provides an incentive to the member institutions to ensure that
their athletes remain academically eligible and are progressing toward a college
degree in each sport, including football and basketball. Failure of an institution
to do so can lead to sanctions imposed by the NCAA.
With regard to financial support to pay for the cost of a college education,
as previously noted, until the last few years the NCAA limited the amount of
athletic scholarships to grant-in-aid expenses and for one year, renewable at the
option of the institution. Due to antitrust litigation, the NCAA has repealed these
limits. Conferences and member institutions are now able to offer multi-year
scholarships that can cover the full cost of attendance. The third subsection
surveys these recent increases in the value of the financial support that college
athletes are receiving.
There is evidence that all of these changes are improving persistence and
graduation rates of athletes, especially those of black males in revenue sports.
This evidence is discussed in the fourth subsection of this part. Even if the NCAA
allowed its member institutions (voluntarily or as a result of court injunctions)
to pay athletes in revenue sports compensation beyond the cost of attending
their institutions, there are several significant legal obstacles that colleges and
universities desiring to do so will encounter. Addressing these obstacles may
substantially increase the cost for member institutions that chose to abandon the
amateur/education model. Thus, while certainly some universities will decide
to provide compensation to their athletes in revenue sports beyond the cost of
attendance, it is unlikely that many member institutions would have the desire
and the ability to do so. These challenges are delineated in the final section of
this part.
A. NCAA and Member Institutions' Efforts to Improve Academic
Performance by Adopting and Increasing Academic Eligibility
Requirements for Athletes
Since 1983, the NCAA has consistently increased academic requirements for
athletes competing in Division I sports. To truly appreciate the scope of the
problem of lack of academic achievement by black male athletes in revenue
sports, it is necessary to take into account the massive societal changes that
started about 60 years ago. As William Bowen and Derek Bok noted in their
hugely influential book, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER, "it is probably safe to say ...
that prior to 1960, no selective college or university was making determined
efforts to seek out and admit substantial numbers of African Americans," and,
hence, recruit black male athletes. A few black players could be found playing
for major college programs in the North and West before this time, but almost
none in the South. This would start to change with the Civil Rights Movement
97 William Bowen and Derek Bok, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER 4 (1998).
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of the 1960s. However, due to its historical animosity to black equality, it would
take longer for universities in the South to enroll black athletes. President John
F. Kennedy had to call out the National Guard in order to ensure the registration
of James Meredith at Ole Miss in the fall of 1962. And Alabama's governor,
George Wallace, delivered an infamous inauguration speech at the portico of the
Alabama State Capitol in January 1963 in which he proclaimed, "In the name of
the greatest people that have ever trod this earth, I draw a line in the dust and toss
the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny, and I say, segregation now, segregation
tomorrow and segregation forever."98 Indeed, legendary Alabama head football
coach Bear Bryant wanted to recruit black players for years before Alabama did
so, but couldn't due to Wallace's objection."
It was not until Billy Jones of Maryland played in a basketball game during
the 1965-66 season that the ACC had its first African-American basketball play-
er.' Elvin Hayes and Don Chaney were the first black basketball players to play
for Guy Lewis at the University of Houston in 1966.101 And the first black to play
for an athletic team in the SEC was Kentucky's Nat Northington when he played
in a game at Indiana University in Bloomington on September 23, 1967. By the
early 1970s, however, substantial recruiting efforts for black players by major
colleges and universities were well underway. This led to a huge influx of black
male athletes on Division I campuses during the 1970s and early 1980s. In about
a generation, black athletes had gone from novelties on Division I college cam-
puses to dominant sports figures.1 0 2
Prior to 1964, the NCAA let each institution determine its own rules about
their athlete's academic eligibility to play. However, that year the NCAA adopted
a rule that required all prospective athletes have a minimum 1.6 predicted GPA
at the institution where they sought to matriculate. This was determined by the
student's high school GPA, class ranking, and combined SAT or ACT score, but
varied for each institution.
In a hotly contested 1968 narrow vote, 163-160, the NCAA lifted its ban on
freshmen eligibility in all sports other than football and basketball.1 03 Supporters
98 All Things Considered, 'Segregation Forever': A Fiery Pledge Forgiven, But Not Forgot-
ten, NPR (Jan. 10, 2013), https://www.npr.ora/2013/01/14/169080969/seareaation-forever-a-fi-
ery-pledge-forgiven-but-not-forgotten.
99 Allen Barra, The Integration of College Football Didn't Happen in One Game, THE ATLANTIC
(May 15, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2013/11/the-intearation-of-col-
lege-football-didnt-hapoen-in-one-ame/281557/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
100 Richard Lapchick, Breaking the College Color Barrier: Studies in Courage, ESPN (Feb. 20,
2008), http://www.espn.com/espn/blackhistorv2008/columns/storv?columnist=lapchick rich-
ard&id=3254974 https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2013/11/the-integration-of-
college-football-didnt-happen-in-one-ame/281557/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
101 Guy V Lewis IL Hall ofFame College Basketball Coach, Dies at 93, WASHINGTON POST (Nov.
28, 2015), https://www.washinatonpo st.com/sports/auv-v-lewis-hall-of-fame-college-basketball-
coach-dies-at-93/2015/11/28/7767abfa-9526-11e5-b5e4-279b4501e8a6 story.html?utm term=.
2c2422a9024c.
102 Ronald A. Smith, PAY FOR PLAY: A HISTORY OF BIG-TIME COLLEGE ATHLETIC REFORM, 151-3
(2010).
103 Walter Byers, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES 162 (1995).
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of the measure argued that member institutions could save money by operating
just one varsity squad per sport. Four years later, the restriction on basketball and
football players was lifted.'
From the beginning, academically rigorous institutions complained about
the 1.6 predicted GPA requirement. They argued that this requirement disadvan-
taged them because it did not take into account the academic strength of a given
institution's programs. These institutions pointed out that a 1.6 GPA at their
institution did not mean that an athlete was a marginal academic student. The
rule also had a negative disparate effecct on the ability of the academically more
rigorous institutions to recruit black athletes at the time that many mainstream
colleges and universities were finally starting to enroll meaningful numbers of
other black students.o' These complaints led the NCAA to repeal the predicted
1.6 GPA requirement in 1973. As a result, the need for a prospective athlete to
have a minimum 2.0 high school GPA was the only academic qualification im-
posed by the NCAA, as the number of black athletes on college campuses started
to explode in the 1970s.1 0 6
After several academic scandals, in 1983, the NCAA adopted the controver-
sial Proposition 48, which took effect in 1986. Prop 48 required that a prospective
athlete who wanted to compete as a freshmen obtain a minimum 2.0 GPA in
11 core academic high school courses and an SAT score of at least 700 or an
ACT score of at least 15. Athletes who met either (but not both) requirements
were deemed partial qualifiers, could still enroll in the institution, and receive an
athletic scholarship. However, a partial qualifier was not eligible to practice or
play as a freshman. If the institution concluded that the athlete made satisfactory
academic progress, then the athlete could play the following year.
Due to the racial differences in standardized test scores, Prop 48's negative
disparate impact on prospective black male athletes was obvious.'0 7 Richard
Lapchick observed that if Prop 48 was in effect in 1981, it would have made
69% of the black male scholarship athletes ineligible to participate in their sport
during their first year.08 For the first two years after Prop 48 was adopted, but
before it went into effect (1984-86), blacks would have constituted 92% of the
academically ineligible basketball and 84% of the ineligible football players. 09
In 1989, the NCAA increased the impact of Prop 48 by adopting Proposition 42.
Where Prop 48 allowed member institutions to provide athletic scholarships to
104 Id.
105 Id. at 129.
106 Francis X. Dealy Jr., WIN AT ANY COST: THE SELL OUT OF COLLEGE ATHLETICS 113 (1990). See
also Jeffrey Waller, A Necessary Evil. Proposition 16 and Its Impact on Academics and Athletics
in the NCAA, 1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 192 (2003).
107 For example, in 1986, the mean SAT score for whites was 1038 and for blacks it was 839. NAT'L
CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., Fast Facts, https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.as2?id=171 (last visited Jan.
21, 2019).
10' See Harry Edwards, CRISIS OF BLACK ATHLETES ON THE EVE OF THE 21ST CENTURY SOCIETY, 9, 10
(2000).
109 Id. at 10.
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partial qualifiers, Proposition 42 eliminated that ability. The NCAA, however,
did allow partial qualifiers to receive need-based scholarships that any other
student at the institution was eligible to receive. Prospective athletes that did not
meet either qualification, however, were banned from receiving even need-based
scholarships. These collective measures led to a sharp drop in the participation
rates of black athletes in Division I, from 24% to 17%. However, by 1993 the
percentage of blacks in Division I sports had rebounded to 28%.110
The NCAA increased academic requirements for freshmen again when it
adopted Proposition 16 in 1992, which took effect in 1996."' Prop 16 increased
the number of core high school academic courses that each athlete had to
take from 11 to 13. This was increased again to 14 in 2003, and to 16 in 2008.
Proposition 16 also introduced a sliding scale for the minimum GPA and SAT/
ACT scores. So, the higher the athlete's high school grades the lower his or her
required corresponding SAT or ACT score could be and vice-a-versa.
Under the current sliding scale, if you have a:
* 3.55 GPA, then you need 400 on the SAT or 37 on the ACT
* 3.25 GPA, then you need 520 on the SAT or 46 on the ACT
* 3.00 GPA, then you need 620 on the SAT or 52 on the ACT
* 2.75 GPA, then you need 720 on the SAT or 59 on the ACT
* 2.50 GPA, then you need 820 on the SAT or 68 on the ACT
* 2.30 GPA, then you need 900 on the SAT or 75 on the ACT112
Under current NCAA regulations, an athlete can also be admitted to a uni-
versity as an academic redshirt. These are high school students who don't meet
the regular academic requirements, but have at least a 2.0 high school GPA and
a corresponding SAT score.
* Under the current sliding scale, if you have a:
* 2.299 GPA, then you need 910 on the SAT or 76 on the ACT
* 2.20 GPA, then you need 940 on the SAT or 79 on the ACT
* 2.10 GPA, then you need 980 on the SAT or 83 on the ACT
* 2.00 GPA, then you need 1020 on the SAT or 86 on the ACT113
As an academic redshirt, the athlete can receive a scholarship and practice,
but not play in competition."' The academic requirements were raised again for
students enrolling in August 2016. While the number of core high school courses
remained at 16, athletes must complete 10 of those courses before their seventh
semester and 7 of the 10 must be in English, math, or natural/physical science.
110 Art Padilla, Educating the Athlete, 22 J.C. & U.L. 37 (1995).
.. The adoption of Proposition 16 was accompanied by litigation attacking it as racially discrimi-
natory. See Cureton v. NCAA 252 F. 3d 267 (2001) and Pryor v. NCAA 288 F.3d 548 (2002).
12 For the sliding scale, see NCAA, REFERENCE CENTER: QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE, http://fs.ncaa.
ora/Docs/eligibility center/Ouick Reference Sheet.pdf.
113 Id.
114 Id.
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Beyond the requirements for freshmen eligibility, in 2003 the NCAA has
also adopted measures to ensure that athletes are progressing toward a college
degree once they are enrolled. Prior to the start of their second year, athletes
must have completed at least 24 semester hours (or 36 quarter hours) and obtain
a GPA that is at least 90% of the minimum GPA required to graduate (1.8 if 2.0
is required). Starting their third year, athletes must designate a program of study
that will lead to a bachelor's degree, complete 40% of academic requirements for
that field of study, and obtain 95% of the minimum GPA required to graduate.
Prior to the fourth year, the degree completion percentage increases to 60% and
100% of the GPA required to graduate, and prior to the fifth year, it increases to
80% toward the degree and 100% of the GPA."5
B. Academic Progress Rate: Obligations of Member Institutions
to Improve Academic Performance of its Athletes
In May 2004, the NCAA adopted legislation that instituted a metric known as
Academic Progress Rate (APR). NCAA president Myles Brand called the adoption
of the APR the "most far-reaching effort of its kind in NCAA history."ll 6 It was the
first time the NCAA adopted a requirement that sanctioned the institutions for the
lack of academic performance of their athletes. The APR provides an incentive
to member institutions to strengthen their academic advising, counseling, and
tutoring services provided to athletes.
APR is calculated for each team at an institution as well as for all the athletes
of a given college or university. Under the APR, each student-athlete receiving
athletically related financial aid earns one retention point for staying in school
and one eligibility point for being academically eligible. A team's APR is calcu-
lated by taking the points earned by athletes and dividing them by the total points
possible, then multiplying that figure by 1000.
The NCAA initially set the minimum APR at 900. But in 2011, it increased
it by requiring teams to meet a minimum four-year APR average of 930 (which
corresponds to a 50% graduation rate) that was to take effect in 2015-16." For an
athletic team at a given school that fails to meet the minimum, it can suffer sanc-
tions. In 2011, the NCAA instituted a three-level penalty structure. The first level
provides for a reduction in possible practice time by four hours and one day per
week. The second level involves a reduction in the number of competitions that
a team can participate in during the regular or postseason. In carrying out APR
sanctions in 2012, the NCAA ended up banning the University of Connecticut's
men's basketball team and nine other schools from playing in the NCAA's men's
basketball tournament, even though the Huskies had won the tournament two
115 NCAA, DIVISIoN I PROGRESS-TOWARD-DEGREE REQUIREMENTS, http://www.ncaa.org/about/divi-
sion-i-progress-toward-degree-requirements.
116 Smith, supra note 102, at 183.
Timothy Davis and Christopher T. Hairston, NCAA Deregulation and Reform: A Radical Shift
of Governance Philosophy? 92 OREGON LAW REVIEW 77, 130 (2014).
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years earlier and finished that year with a 20-10 record." Eighteen teams were
banned the following year, although 11 of them were historically black colleges
and universities (HBCUs)."9 The third level of punishment involves coaching
suspensions, financial aid reductions, and restricted NCAA membership.1 20
C. Multi-Year and Increases in Amount of Athletic Scholarships
In 1956, the NCAA changed its constitution and bylaws to allow its member
institutions to award scholarships based on athletic abilities. These new athletic
scholarships could cover grant-in-aid amounts plus an additional $15 per month
for miscellaneous expenses.121 The schools could pay an athlete's educational
and living expenses for four years. However, during the four years the institution
could not reduce the financial support to the athlete if the athlete decided to stop
playing, was injured and couldn't play, or proved not as talented as the school
had hoped. By the early 1960s, coaches and athletic directors were complaining
about this system because it put the athletes in a very powerful position. In
1967, the NCAA adopted legislation that provided if the athlete only made token
appearances at practice or did not show up, then the institution could consider
such action as fraudulent misrepresentation and would constitute grounds for
termination of financial aid.1 2 2 This definition of fraudulent misrepresentation
still left the member institutions obligated to pay athletes who could not play
due to injuries or recruiting mistakes. In 1973, the NCAA adopted a measure
that limited athletic scholarships to one year, renewable at the option of the
institution.1 2 3 Thus, an institution was under no obligation to provide a scholarship
to its current athletes the next year, which became a common practice. For
example, according to the National College Players Association, which claims
7,000 active members, 22% of top Division I men's basketball players found their
scholarships were not renewed between 2008 and 2009.124
"1 There were nine other schools that were also ruled ineligible for the NCAA Tournament along
with UConn, Arkansas-Pine Bluff, California-Riverside, Cal State Bakersfield, Jacksonville State,
Mississippi Valley State, North Carolina-Wilmington, Texas A&M-Corpus Christi, Toledo, and
Towson. See APR: Ten Teams Lose Postseason, ESPN (June 20, 2012), http://www.eson.com/
mens-college-basketball/storv/ /id/8077431/connecticut-huskies-9 -others-sit-vostseason-apr.
119 N.C.A.A. Hands Out Postseason Bans for Academics, but UConn Is Back, N.Y. TIMES (June
11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/soorts/ncaabasketball/ncaa-hands-out-postseason-
bans-for-academics-but-uconn-is-back.html.
120 See Academic Progress Rate Explained, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.ora/aboutresources/re-
search/academic-progress-rate-explained.
121 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 1956-57 YEARBOOK, at 4.
122 NCAA PROCEEDINGS OF THE 61ST ANNUAL CONVENTION, Jan. 9-11, 1967, at 122.
123 NCAA CONST. ART. 15.3.3.1 (2011), reprinted in 2011-12 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, CONSTITU-
TION, OPERATING BYLAWS, ADMINISTRATIVE BYLAWS.
124 Branch, supra note 15.
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Due to the risk of antitrust litigation, in recent years the NCAA has moved
to increase the ability of member institutions to provide more financial support to
athletes, including abandoning the renewable one-year scholarship limitation.'2 5
Since 2012, the NCAA has allowed schools to provide multi-year scholarships.
Member institutions are now in the position of deciding whether they will offer
multi-year scholarships, how many they will offer, and to whom they will extend
such offers. With multi-year scholarships, athletes will not lose their scholarships
due to injury or inadequate athletic performance. Both the Big Ten and Pac 12
have agreed to offer multi-year scholarships to all of their athletes as long as
the athletes follow team rules and remain academically eligible.1 2 6 A number
of other schools, including Florida, South Carolina, Oklahoma State, Kentucky,
Clemson, and Virginia, have also decided to offer multi-year scholarships.1 27
As with multi-year scholarships, antitrust litigation also led the NCAA to
abandon its rules and regulations limiting the amount of the scholarship to grant-
in-aid amounts. In a class action case, White v. NCAA,'1 28 football and basketball
athletes challenged the NCAA limit on athletic scholarships to grant-in-aid
amounts. They argued that colleges and universities should be allowed to offer
cost-of-attendance scholarships. The court denied the NCAA's motion to dismiss
the claim. As a result, the NCAA settled the case in 2008 and agreed to provide
$218 million to Division I schools for the benefit of student-athletes for the next
five years, made $10 million available for claims by qualified former student-ath-
letes, permitted Division I schools to provide comprehensive health insurance to
student-athletes, and permitted schools to provide insurance against sports-re-
lated injuries to student-athletes.1 29 But, the NCAA maintained the grant-in-aid
limit on scholarships.
On August 8, 2014, Federal District Court Judge Claudia Wilken's opinion in
O'Bannon v. NCAA 3 0 struck down the NCAA's grant-in-aid limit on the amount
of that athletic scholarship for FBS football and men's basketball as an unrea-
sonable restraint on trade.'3 ' In her opinion, Judge Wilken did not preclude the
NCAA from capping the amount of compensation that athletes received while in
125 Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012).
126 Ben Strauss, Colleges' Shift on Four-Year Scholarships Reflects Players' Growing Power,
N.Y. TiNiws (Oct. 14, 2014), htto://www.nvtimes.com/2014/10/29/sports/colleaes-shift-on-four-vear-
scholarships-reflects-plavers-growing-power.html? r=0 (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
117 Jon Solomon, Schools Can Give Out 4-YearAthletic Scholarships, but Many Don 't, CBS
SPORTS (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/schools-can-give-out-4-
vear-athletic-scholarships-but-manv-dont/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
12 White v. NCAA, No. CV 06-999-RGK (MANx), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101366, at *1-2 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 20, 2006).
129 Thomas A. Baker III et al., White v. NCAA: A Chink in the AntitrustArmor, 21 J. LEGAL As-
PECTS SPORT 75, 77 (2011).
130 O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 971 (2014) rev. O Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir.,
2015) cert. den. 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016).
131 On August 8, 2014, Federal District Court Judge Claudia Wilken's opinion in O 'Bannon v.
NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 971 (2014) rev. O Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir., 2015) cert.
den. 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016), struck down the NCAA's grant-in-aid limit on the amount of that athlet-
ic scholarship for FBS football and men's basketball as an unreasonable restraint on trade.
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school. However, she did enjoin the NCAA from setting this cap amount below
the cost-of-attendance expenses, as the term is defined in its current bylaws.'32
Judge Wilken also prohibited the NCAA from enforcing any rules preventing a
member school or conference from depositing up to $5,000 a year of deferred
compensation from funds derived by the use of student-athletes' names, images,
or likenesses in an account for each of them as long they remained academi-
cally eligible to compete. However, the Court order did not prohibit the NCAA
from enacting and enforcing rules that required each recruit in the same class
to receive the same amount of deferred compensation.'33 Also, the court order
did not prohibit the NCAA from limiting the ability of its member institutions
to place the deferred compensation funds in a separate account for the athletes
that would not be distributed until after each athlete either left the institution or
his or her eligibility expired.'34 Prompted by this litigation, in January 2015, the
NCAA repealed its rule that limited all athletic scholarships, including those in
non-revenue sports, to grant-in-aid amounts.
On September 30, 2015, the 9th Circuit affirmed the part of Judge Wilken's
decision that prevented the NCAA from setting a limit on the amount of the ath-
letic scholarship below the cost-of-attendance amounts. All three judges agreed
that the District Court was correct on this point. The 9th Circuit judges pointed
out that student-athletes who receive the full cost of attendance for their services
are still not receiving compensation beyond their college expenses. Allowing
colleges and universities to pay the full cost of attendance of their athletes is
completely consistent with amateurism and is a less restrictive way of advancing
that pro-competitive justification than limiting the scholarships of athletes to
grant-in-aid amounts. The deferred compensation was another matter. The judg-
es split 2 to 1 on whether the District Court should have enjoined the NCAA from
preventing member institutions and conferences from providing student-athletes
with up to $5,000 a year in deferred compensation. As the majority stated, "not
paying student-athletes is precisely what makes them amateurs." 35 Thus, "the
difference between offering student-athletes education-related compensation
and offering them cash sums untethered to educational expenses is not minor; it
is a quantum leap." 36 Chief Judge Thomas opined in dissent that he would have
upheld the lower court's injunction on this matter as well.1 37
132 O'Bannon, at 7 F. Supp. at 1007-8.
133 Id. at 1008 ("Furthermore, consistent with Plaintiffs' representation that they are only seeking
to enjoin restrictions on the sharing of group licensing revenue, the NCAA may enact and enforce
rules ensuring that no school may offer a recruit a greater share of licensing revenue than it offers
any other recruit in the same class on the same team."). Shortly after the decision, University of
Texas athletic director Steve Patterson announced that it would start to pay each of its student-ath-
letes $10,000 per year, $5,000 for COA payments and $5,000 for use of its name and likeness.
Zach Barnett, Texas Will Begin Paying Each of its Athletes $10,000 Per Year, FOOTBALL ScooP
(Oct. 22, 2014), http://footballscoop.com/news/texas-will-begin-pavin-athletes-10000-vear/
134 O'Bannon, at 7 F. Supp. at 1008.
135 O'Bannon, at 1076.
136 O'Bannon, at 1078.
137 O Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1079, 1083 (Thomas, Chief Judge, concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (9th Cir. 2015).
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At the NCAA's January 2015 Convention, the NCAA also restructured its
rules to allow a groups of conferences and schools to govern themselves through
autonomous regulations. The NCAA was responding to pressure brought by
members of some of its major conferences and the University of Notre Dame.
This measure provided the mechanism for the creation of the Power Five Confer-
ences, who then approved a measure that increased their athletic scholarships to
cover athletes' full cost of attendance. A number of other conferences followed
suit. The result of these changes led to an almost 9% gain in 2016 in the amount
of financial aid provided by the 230 Division I schools' that USA Today tracks.
This was the largest gain in financial aid for athletes since 2010.138
It is worth pointing out that the litigation in the O'Bannon case only involved
athletes in revenue sports. However, the reaction by the conferences and institu-
tions that agreed to increase their athletic scholarships to the cost-of-attendance
amounts increased their scholarships for all athletes. So once again, the athletes
in revenue sports are the impetus to improving the compensation provided to all
college athletes.
D. Evidence of Improved Graduation Rates
The desire to win and the benefits that come from winning FBS football and men's
basketball teams provides a strong incentive to colleges and universities to place
the needs of their athletic programs above their academic interests. Thus, the
revenue sports continue to be plagued by academic scandals such as the recent
one at one of America's most venerated academic institutions, the University of
North Carolina.1 3 9 Nevertheless, all of the changes previously noted appear to
have increased the academic success of student-athletes in revenue-generating
sports, especially black males.
There are two different reported ways to assess academic success of stu-
dent-athletes in college. The federal approach is essentially a two-snapshot
approach to determining the percentage of college students at a given institution
who graduated. One snapshot looks at the number of students who entered an
academic institution and the second at how many of those who entered graduated
from that institution six years later. As a result, this approach fails to account for
students who transfer to a different institution and graduate. Indeed, any transfer
student is treated as a dropout, even though as many as one-third of students
transfer at least once while in college and still graduate.'40
138 Steve Berkowitz and Christopher Schnaars, Colleges Are Spending More on Their Athletes
Because They Can, USA TODAY (July 6, 2017), https://www.usatodav.com/storv/soorts/col-
lege/2017/07/06/colleges-spending-more-their-athletes-because-thev-can/449433001/
139 The scandal involved allegations that covered an 18-year period. Almost half of the 3,100
students were athletes who benefited from taking courses where professors gave high grades even
though the students did not show up for class, turn in papers, or take tests. See Mike Rutherford,
North Carolina Academic Scandal Will End Quietly, Just Like Everyone Wanted, SB NATION (June
5, 2015), htto://www.sbnation.com/college-basketball/2015/6/5/8735807/north-carolina-basket-
ball-academic-scandal-ncaa-2015.
140 Bernard Franklin, More Lightning and Less Thunder: The Challenge for NCAA Athletics 16,
17 in REVERSING FIELD: EXAMINING COMMERCIALIZATION, LABOR, GENDER, AND RACE IN 21sT CENTURY
SPORTS LAW 34, 35 (Eds. Andr'e Douglas Pond Cummings and Anne Marie Lofaso, 2010).
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Since the NCAA and its member institutions track student-athletes for six
years, they have the capabilities of taking into account transfers in their calcu-
lations of academic success. Thus, the NCAA developed the graduation success
rate (GSR) approach in 2005 because it felt that there was a need for a more
accurate measure of academic success than the methodology employed by the
federal government. In contrast to the federal graduation rate, the GSR will add
to the number of incoming freshmen in a given cohort students who first enter
college in the middle of the first year, as well as transfer students who receive
athletic aid. The GSR also deducts from the numbers of a given cohort allowable
exclusions 4' and athletes who left their institution prior to graduation but still
had athletic eligibility remaining and were academically eligible to compete
had they returned to their institutions. While the GSR is more accurate than the
federal approach, the GSR is not comparable to the graduation results generated
by the federal approach.
Using federal graduation data, Shaun Harper, Collin Williams, and Horatio
Blackman of the Center for the Study of Race & Equity in Education at the
University of Pennsylvania published a study of graduation results of the 76
member institutions of six major Division I conferences that existed at the time:
the ACC, Big Ten, Big 12, Pac 12, SEC, and the old Big East.1 42 They found
that across four cohorts that graduated between 2007 and 2010, the black male
student-athletes graduated at a rate of 50.2% in six years. In contrast, they found
that the percentage for black undergraduate males at these institutions who grad-
uated in six years was 55.5%. For comparisons, their study found that 66.9% of
student-athletes overall, and 72.8% of undergraduate students overall graduated
in six years.143 Harper did a follow-up study three years later and found that
six-year graduation rates for all groups had improved. He found that "53.6% of
Black male student-athletes graduated within six years, compared to 68.5% of
student-athletes overall, 58.4% of Black undergraduate men overall, and 75.4%
of undergraduate students overall."'4 4
Where the aforementioned study indicated that black male athletes had lower
graduation rates than black male students on the same campuses, other evidence
suggests that black male athletes are graduating at higher rates than other black
males. Another study indicated that if you look at all black male athletes in Di-
vision I, they have graduated at higher rates than non-athlete black males every
year during the study years of 1991-2017, but the gap has increased from 5% in
141 Those who either die or become permanently disabled, those who leave the school to join the
armed forces, foreign services, or attend a church mission.
142 Harper, supra note 18. Five schools included in the study (DePaul University, Marquette Uni-
versity, Providence College, Seton Hall University, and St. John's University) did not have football
teams, so only basketball team members were included for them.
143 Id. at 2.
144 Id. at 1.
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1991 (33% to 28o) to 15% (55% to 40o) in 2017.'15 Michelle Brutlag Hosick
agreed with the study's federal graduation rates in 2017 for black male student and
non-student athletes in Division I, but went further. She found that black athletes
(male and female) were outpacing all blacks in Division I, graduating at a rate of
59% compared to 46%. 146 The 59% graduation rate is a substantial increase from
the 35% rate for the ones entering college in 1984.'11 Another study pointed out
that federal graduation rates for African-Americans in revenue sports are also
higher than African-American males in the student body, men's basketball by
9% and FBS football by 13%. 1 This study also showed that between 1991 and
2017, the federal graduation rate for black men's basketball players had increased
from 29% to 49% and for black male FBS football players from 35% to 60%. 9
The GSR paints an even rosier picture regarding the increasing academic
progress of black male student-athletes. In 2017, the GSR reached an all-time high
of 87% for Division I athletes. 50 The overall GSR for black male student-athletes
in Division I was 77%, which is a 2 1% increase since 2002.'' In addition, 78%
of black men's basketball players earned their degrees, which is up a staggering
32 points since 2002.152 For black football players who were enrolled in FBS
schools, their GSR was a record 73%, which is a 20 point increase since 2002.153
In a separate study, Lapchick reported that the average GSR for the black male
145 See Trends in Graduation Success Rates and Federal Graduation Rates at NCAA Division I
Institutions, NCAA RESEARCH, at 52 (Nov. 2017), available at httvs://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/
files/2017DIRES Grad Rate Trends FINAL 20171108.pdf.) (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). In 1991
it was 33% compared to 28%, but in 2017 it was 55% compared to 40%. Id. There are still gaps
with the corresponding white players. Thus, black male men's basketball federal graduation rates
have closed from 24% to 13% and for black male FBS football from 21 to 14%. Id.
146 Michelle Brutlag Hosick, DIAfrican-American Student-Athletes Graduate at RecordRates,
NCAA (Nov. 8, 2017), http://www.ncaa.ora/about/resources/media-center/news/di-african-ameri-
can-student-athletes-graduate-record-rates.
147 Id.
148 See Trends in Graduation Success Rates and Federal Graduation Rates at NCAA Divi-
sion IInstitutions, NCAA RESEARCH AT 41 (Nov. 2017), httns://www.ncaa.ora/sites/default/
files/2017DIRES Grad Rate Trends FINAL 20171108.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
149 See Trends in Graduation Success Rates and Federal Graduation Rates at NCAA Divi-
sion I Institutions, NCAA RESEARCH AT 44 (Nov. 2017), https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/
files/2017DIRES Grad Rate Trends FINAL 20171108.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). There are
still gaps with the corresponding white players. Thus, black male men's basketball federal gradua-
tion rates have closed from 24% to 13% and for black male FBS football from 21 to 14%. Id.
15o A record 84% of Division I athletes who entered college in 2007 graduated six years later. Jake
New, More Athletes Get to the Finish Line, INSIDE HIGHER EDUCATION (Oct. 29, 2014) (discussing
the GSR vs. federal rate generally), https://www.insidehiahered.com/news/2014/10/29/aradua-
tion-rates-athletes-hit-record-high (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).





athletes in the 80 Division I football schools that played in a bowl game in 2016
was 68%, two percentage points higher than in 2015.'15
E. Legal Obstacles to Altering the Amateur/Education Model
Even if the NCAA allowed its member institutions, voluntarily or as a result
of court injunctions like that issued by Judge Wilken's in Alston v. NCAA, to
compensate athletes in revenue sports beyond cost-of-attendance scholarships,
those that want to pay athletes will face a virtual legal minefield of potential
problems. Colleges and universities will have to assure themselves that if they
abandon the amateur/education model and pay their athletes in revenue sports
it doesn't trigger a re-evaluation of whether the income they receive from these
sports teams is unrelated business income for the higher education institution and,
thus, subject to federal income taxes. The first section of this part will discuss
this major issue. Member institutions will also have to determine the impact of
paying some or all of their athletes in revenue sports on the athletic scholarships
amounts beyond the cost-of-attendance scholarships. If doing so leads to a
substantial amount of what athletes receive becoming subject to federal income
taxes, then the colleges and universities will have to increase their compensation
to the athletes to put them in the same position they are in today. The second
section will address this issue. Paying athletes beyond the cost of attendance runs
the risk that they will be viewed as employees under other statutory schemes that
govern the employer/employee relationship. Consequently, as addressed in the
third subsection, there are a number of collateral consequences that will result
from athletes being considered employees under these other statutory schemes.
All of these legal hurdles may prevent many, otherwise willing, institutions from
abandoning the amateur/education model to provide additional compensation
for their athletes. When these legal obstacles are taken together, despite current
antitrust actions in the courts, it seems very unlikely that many colleges and
universities will abandon the amateur/education model. 5 5
1. Could Incomefrom Revenue Sports Become Taxable to the Member Institu-
tions as Unrelated Business Income
Under current federal income tax law, athletes in revenue sports who are
receiving athletic scholarships are not considered employees. A few years
ago, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") recently reiterated this point. The
Northwestern University football players who receive scholarships for grant-in-
aid amounts filed a petition under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") to
have a representation election to elect the College Athletes Players Association
to represent them for collective bargaining purposes. In March 2014, Regional
154 Richard Lapchick et al., Inst. for Diversity and Ethics in Sports, KEEPING SCORE WHEN IT
COUNTS: ASSESSING THE ACADEMIC RECORDS OF THE 2016-2017 BOWL-BOUND COLLEGE FOOTBALL
TEAM (2016), htto://nebula.wsima.com/13533ce46b93ecadl3c6a8304c43868f?AccessKevld=-
DAC3A56D8FB782449D2A&disposition=O&alloworigin=1.
155 However, some commentators assume that these obstacles are not insurmountable and that
paying athletes may not alter college sports very much. See, e.g., Jeffrey Standen, THE NEXT LABOR
MARKET IN SPORTS, 92 OR. L. REV. 1093 (2014).
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Office 13 of the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") concluded that
they did meet the definition of employees under the NLRA.' 56 In response to
a letter from Senator Richard Burr, the IRS issued a letter ruling on April 9,
2014. Burr had asked the IRS about the potential tax implications of the "recent
decision of a regional office of the National Labor Relations Board that all grant-
in-aid scholarship football players at Northwestern fall within the definition
of employees under the National Labor Relations Act."' In response, the IRS
stated that the NLRB's decision does not control "whether the individual is an
employee for federal tax purposes. Accordingly, the NLRB decision does not
control the tax treatment of athletic Scholarships." 158
Based on data compiled from the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act, be-
tween 2003 and 2014, FBS universities generated football-related revenues of
$27.4 billion.5 9 The corresponding expenses associated with these revenues,
including athletic scholarships, was $16.8 billion. This meant that those schools
generated a net profit of $10.6 billion dollars for those years. The broad tax
exemption provided by IRC Section 501(c)(3), specifically includes educational
institutions and amateur sport organizations in its list of organizations that serve
charitable purposes, public purposes, or both.160 As a result, non-profit colleges,
universities, and the NCAA are exempt organizations. Currently, the IRS exempts
income generated by colleges' and universities' revenue sports programs from
taxation because the income is viewed as "substantially related" to a university's
educational mission.
Up through 1950, exempt organizations were not subject to tax on any of their
revenue as long as the funds were used to further their tax-exempt purposes.161
156 The NLRB, however, unanimously decided on August 17, 2015, not to assert jurisdiction
over this attempt. 362 NLRB No. 167 (2015). The NLRB General Counsel, however, issued a
memorandum on January 31, 2017, stating that he nevertheless found that FBS football players on
scholarship were employees under the NLRA. See Memorandum GC 17-0 1, available at httns://
www.nlrb.Lgov/reports-auidance/general-counsel-memos. But, some jurisdictions have passed laws
to prevent student-athletes from unionizing; see also Ohio Rev. Code §3345.56 (2015) and Mich.
Comp. Laws 423.201 Sec. 1. (e) (iii) (2015) (An individual serving as a graduate student research
assistant or in an equivalent position, a student participating in intercollegiate athletics on behalf
of a public university in this state, or any individual whose position does not have sufficient indicia
of an employer-employee relationship using the 20-factor test announced by the IRS of the United
States Department of Treasury in revenue ruling 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 is not a public employee
entitled to representation or collective bargaining rights under this act.)
157 For a copy of the IRS letter to Senator Richard Burr, see https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
wd/14-0016.df.
158 Id.
159 Richard Borghesi, Pay For Play: The Financial Value ofNCAA Football Players, 49 AP-
PLIED ECONOMICS 46, (2017).
160 Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational
purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of
its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment) . . . Section 501(c)(3).
161 Richard L. Kaplan, Intercollegiate Athletics and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 1430, 1432-37 (1980).
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However, Congress enacted provisions that imposed a tax on the unrelated busi-
ness income of tax-exempt organizations as part of the Revenue Act of 1950.162
Unrelated business income is revenue earned by a tax-exempt organization that
is regularly carried on, but is not substantially related to the accomplishment
of the organization's exempt purpose.'63 In the regulations discussing unrelated
business income, the IRS uses an example of selling tickets to a public perfor-
mance by students to assert that this is not unrelated business income because
the activity of teaching students how to perform in front of a live audience is part
of performance art training.'64 Arguably, this same rationale would apply to the
sale of tickets to live college football and basketball games. With regard to the
receipt by colleges and universities of television revenue for their athletic events,
in 1977, the IRS concluded that income from broadcasting college sports events
was taxable.16 5 This position, however, drew substantial public protest, leading
the IRS to issue an unpublished Technical Advice Memoranda, which concluded
that there was no material distinction between providing for a game to be seen in
person by 100,00 people and providing for it to be seen by much larger audience
on television.'66
As for the NCAA and its revenue generated from the men's basketball
tournament, the 10th Circuit in NCAA v. Commissioner ofInternal Revenue con-
cluded that the NCAA did not generate unrelated business income when it sold
advertisements in game programs during the tournament.6 7 The court stated that
neither the tournament itself nor the sale of program advertising were unrelated
business income because it was conducted for only a three-week period once a
year; thus, the tournament was not a regularly carried on business.'68
But in 1991, the IRS concluded that money received from corporate spon-
sorships of college football games was unrelated business income.16 9 Congress,
however, responded to this decision six years later by enacting a specific
162 According to Kaplan, "During the congressional hearings of 1950, witnesses expressed
concern about many typical university enterprises-from bookstores to university presses to
experimental farms. The committee reports responded to these concerns and referred to such
operations as 'related' businesses, thereby exempting them from the new tax. But no mention of
intercollegiate athletics can be found in the House or Senate hearings." Id at 1436.
163 IRC § 513(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d).
164 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1 (d)(4)(i) ex. 1.
165 See IRS Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-51-002 (Jan. 1, 1978). The IRS notified several universities and
the Cotton Bowl Athletic Association, the tax-exempt organization that sponsors the Cotton Bowl
football game, that revenues from broadcasting the game constituted unrelated business income.
166 Id.; see also id., at 78-51-005 (Jan. 1, 1978); 78-51-006 (Jan. 1, 1978).
1 914 F.2d 1417, 1421-22 (10th Cir. 1990).
168 Id. at 1424-6.
169 IRS Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007 (Nov. 22, 1991); For a discussion of this decision, see David
A. Halmes, Corporate Sponsorships ofCharity Events and the Unrelated Business Income Tax:
Will Congress or the Courts Black the IRS Rush to Sack the College Football Bowl Games?, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1079 (1992).
4)-
JLAS 29-1 * 2019 65
exemption from unrelated business income for "qualified sponsorship."' The
IRS regulations promulgated pursuant to this Congressional act draw a distinc-
tion between income from sponsorships that are not taxable and income from
advertising that is taxable. Basically, if the corporate sponsorship only allows
a corporation to display its name, logo, or product lines, then the payment will
qualify as "sponsorship" payment, not advertising.
All of this means that under current IRS interpretations, revenue generated
from FBS football and men's basketball is not currently subject to federal income
tax as unrelated business income for either the NCAA or its member institutions.
If amateurism is rejected as a necessary components of college athletics, howev-
er, and Division I institutions begin to pay their athletes amounts beyond cost of
attendance this could (and we stress "could") raise the question of whether the
IRS should revisit the issue of whether the funds produced by revenue sports are
unrelated business income for the colleges and universities."'
Closely related to this issue is the fact that contributions to athletic programs
of Division I colleges and universities are tax exempt. But, if athletes in revenue
sports are paid more in compensation it could negatively impact the tax-exempt
status of athletic departments because member institutions would no longer be
fostering amateur competition.'72
2. Taxable Implications ofAthletic Scholarships
Section 117 of the IRC provides that students can exclude from their income,
for the purpose of determining federal income taxes, the amounts of a qualified
scholarship. Such a recipient must be enrolled at an educational institution and the
primary purpose of the scholarship must be to further the recipient's education.
The IRS limits the amount of the exclusion to qualified expenses, which are
defined as tuition, required fees, and/or books, supplies, and equipment required
1o Roni A. Elias, Collegiate Athletics and the Unrelated Business Income Tax: Old Assumptions
and New Directions for an Issue of Charitable Tax Exemptions, 5 ARIZ. ST. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 50,
71-2 (2015).
171 For an article that discusses this issue, see Roni A. Elias, Collegiate Athletics and the Unre-
lated Business Income Tax: OldAssumptions and New Directions for an Issue of Charitable Tax
Exemptions, 5 ARIZ. ST. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 50 (2015).
172 See, e.g., Darren A. Heitner, Money and Sports: Economic Realities ofBeing an Athlete, 8
DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 169 (2012). "[T]he term 'charitable contribution'
means a contribution or gift to or for the use of a corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or
foundation organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or edu-




of all students in the course.'73 Amounts used to cover room and board, however,
are not excludable from gross income."' Nor would amounts of a scholarship
received for miscellaneous cost-of-attendance expenses be excluded.
Separate from the issue of the taxability of athletic scholarships, funds given
to students by colleges and universities as compensation for past, present, or future
employment services under the control of the university, or for studies or research
for the primary benefit of the university, do not qualify as scholarships and are
subject to federal income taxes.' As a result, there is an argument that the IRS
should have concluded that athletic scholarships for revenue sports were taxable
some time ago, because given the revenue generated by FBS football and men's
basketball, arguably, funds provided for services to the players on these teams are
for the primary benefit of the university. But the IRS adopted Revenue Ruling 77-
263 more than 40 years ago. The ruling addressed the taxability of college athletic
scholarships where the amount of the scholarship did not exceed "expenses for
tuition and fees, room and board (or commuting and lunches), and books and
supplies necessary for the student's studies." 76 In this ruling, the IRS concluded
that athletic scholarships are excludable from the recipient's gross income.
Revenue Ruling 77-263 was issued seven years before the Supreme Court's
opinion in NCAA v. Board of Regents, ' which is well before college sports
became such a major commercial activity. And, the ruling was issued at a time
when the NCAA's rule that limited athletic scholarships to one-year renewable
grant-in-aid amounts was in effect. The IRS has not addressed this ruling in
the past 40 years. However, scholars have done so. Some of these scholars have
pointed out that student-athletes in revenue sports should be viewed as employ-
ees under the right-of-control test. In addition, they point out that, in practice, the
academic studies of these athletes take a back seat to their university's primary
agenda of increasing its revenue and providing more exposure for the institution.
As a result, the rationale of Revenue Ruling 77-263 no longer applies, and the
current athletic scholarships provided to athletes in revenue sports should be
viewed as taxable income to the athletes up to the fair market value of their ser-
vices.'78 Regardless of whether this position currently has merit, compensating
173 Section 117 of the IRC allows a student pursuing a degree to exclude any amounts of a qual-
ified scholarship from their gross income. This includes amounts spent for tuition, fees, books,
and supplies. For a recent articles discussing this issue, see Kathryn Kisska-Schulze and Adam
Epstein, Northwestern, O 'Bannon and the Future: Cultivating a New Era for Taxing Qualified
Scholarships, 49 AKRON L. REV. 771 (2016), and Patrick Michael Tutka and Dylan Williams, The
Expensive Truth: The Possible Tax Implications Related to Scholarship and Cost ofAttendance
Payments for Athletes 27, J. LEGAL ASPECTS AND SPORT 145 (2017).
174 Even though IRS rules make the portion of an athletic scholarship that covers room and board
taxable, this is normally not enforced.
175 26 C.F.R. § 1.117-4(c).
176 Revenue Ruling 77-263.
177 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
171 Patrick Michael Tutka and Dylan Williams, The Expensive Truth: The Possible Tax Implica-
tions Related to Scholarship and Cost ofAttendance Payments for Athletes, 27 J. LEGAL ASPECTS
AND SPORT 145, 151-2 (2017).
4)-
JLAS 29-1 * 2019 67
students beyond the cost of attendance could lead the IRS to take another look at
the entire compensation issue of college athletes. Providing athletes in revenue
sports with compensation beyond the cost of attendance strengthens the argu-
ment that the characterization of the compensation provided athletes has changed
from university and student-athlete to that of employer/employee. Thus, if col-
leges and universities started to pay their athletes beyond the cost of attendance,
the IRS might conclude that an athletic scholarship is part of a larger employee
compensation package, and, thus, the amount up to the fair market value of the
athlete's services should be subject to federal income tax."' Such a change would
also have implications for state and local income taxes as well.
3. Other Consequences ifStudent-Athletes are Viewed as Employees
Student-athletes are not viewed as employees under the various legal regimes
that otherwise apply to the employer/employee relationship. As Matt Mitten, the
executive director of the National Sports Law Institute at Marquette Law School,
pointed out, if college athletes are paid "they would likely be characterized as
employees. And that has a number of implications."' Thus, if colleges and
universities start to pay athletes funds beyond cost of attendance, the notion that
they are student-athletes, and not employees, might change under a number of
legal schemes.
Scholarship funds paid to employees are currently not subject to the Federal
Insurance Contributions Act ("FICA"). Under FICA, wages paid by employers
to employees and received by employees from an employer are both subject to
a tax rate of 7.65% for both the employer and employee (or a combined rate of
15.30%o), up to a $132,900 for 2019.81 These funds are used to cover social security
payments and Medicare health coverage primarily for the elderly. Section 3121(b)
(10) of the IRC excludes wages paid by a university to a student enrolled and
regularly attending classes for taxes under FICA.18 2 Treasury Department regu-
lations, however, do not allow this exclusion if a student is considered a full-time
employee with a normal work schedule over 40 hours. In a 2011 opinion, the
Supreme Court held that this regulation meant that medical students enrolled
in residency programs do not qualify for the exclusion.8 3 In theory, the NCAA
rules limit the amount of time athletes can spend on their sport to 20 hours per
week. But, the rules also allow for "voluntary" workouts that do not count in the
limit. These voluntary activities include travel, warm-ups, and extra practices.
Thus, athletes frequently devote 40 hours or more to their sport each week.
179 Kathryn Kisska-Schulze and Adam Epstein, Northwestern, O 'Bannon and the Future: Culti-
vating a New Era for Taxing Qualied Scholarships 49 AKRON L. REV. 771, 809 (2016).
I Ivan Maisel, Paying Players Might Create Havoc, ESPN (July 15, 2011), http://www.espn.com/
college-sports/storv/ /id/676857 1/legal-issues-arise-pavina-student-athletes (last visited Feb. 3,
2018).
1I There are two components to the FICA contributions, 6.2% for social security and 1.45% for
Medicare premiums. While there is no income limit for the calculation of Medicare premiums,
there is a limit of $132,900 in 2019 for social security contributions.
182 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(10) (2012).
183 Mayo Foundation for Medical Educ. and Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 (2011).
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If student-athletes are paid amounts beyond cost of attendance, the IRS may
re-examine its current position regarding these exclusions of funds received by
athletes in revenue sports from their institutions.
There are several other potential legal issues involved if athletes become
employees. If student-athletes are viewed as employees, then state workmen's
compensation laws might apply.'"' As former NCAA president Walter Byers
pointed out in his book, Unsportmsanlike Conduct: Exploiting College Athletes,
it was the fear of athletes becoming employees for purposes of workmen's com-
pensation that prompted most of the colleges to unite and insist with one voice on
the concept of the student-athlete and that college sports was for amateurs.',, If
courts and state industrial commissions conclude that athletes in revenue sports
are employees for purposes of workmen's compensation laws then colleges and
universities would be required to provide athletes who are employees with cer-
tain benefits when they are "injured on the job." These benefits could include not
only permanent disability payments, but also payment of long-term medical care
for sports-related injuries.
Other issues to address if a plausible argument can be made that athletes are
employees include whether the Federal Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") applies to
members of FBS football and men's basketball teams.'86 While a student-athlete
receiving scholarships that cover even the grant-in-aid amounts would receive far
more than minimum wage, what about the walk-on non-scholarship athletes on
a revenue sports team? Does the fact that many of the non-scholarship athletes'
teammates are being compensated beyond the cost of attendance convert these
non-scholarship athletes into employees for FLSA purposes and, thus, eligible
for minimum wage requirements for their athletic "work"? Through the legal
doctrine of respondeat superior, colleges and universities could also become
civilly liable for some of the tortious conduct of their athlete employees, includ-
ing outrageous conduct during sporting contests.8 7 This would increase the risk
exposure of universities. Athletes who are considered employees and who play
for public universities might gain certain due process rights to their continued
184 One of the concerns that led to the NCAA becoming more of an enforcement mechanism were
cases that held student-athletes were employees under Workmen's Compensation statutes. See
Univ. ofDenver v. Nemeth, 257 P2d 423 (Colo. 1953) and Van Horn v. Indus. Accident Comm n, 33
CAL. RPTR. 169 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
115 Walter Byers, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES 69 (1995).
186 Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 2016) (rejecting claim by University of Pennsylvania
women's track and field athletes that FLSA applies to them). But see id. at 294 (Hamilton, J. con-
curring) ("I am less confident, however, that our reasoning should extend to students who receive
athletic scholarships to participate in so-called revenue sports like Division I men's basketball and
FBS football."). See also Dawson v. NCAA, 2016 WL 5405638 (N.D. Cal. Filed Sept. 26, 2016).
117 See Hanson v. Kynast 494 N.E.2d 1091 (Ohio 1993) (holding that university student, who
received no scholarships or compensation, voluntarily became member of university lacrosse
team, purchased his own equipment and received instructions from coach, but was not otherwise
controlled by coach, was not agent of university so as to impose liability upon university, under
doctrine of respondeat superior, for injuries inflicted by student upon player of opposing team).
In contrast, see Manning v. Grimsley 643 F.2d 20, 21-22 (1st Cir. 1981) (applying Massachusetts's
vicarious liability law for employers to professional sports franchise) where the Baltimore Orioles
were potentially liable for the actions of their employee pitcher who threw a baseball at a fan.
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membership on their respective team, and, possibly, playing time.' 8 Universities,
as employers, might have to pay unemployment insurance taxes on the wages of
their athletes-turned-employees.
Another significant legal hurdle to address if athletes in revenue sports
are provided compensation beyond cost-of-attendance scholarships is Title IX.
Title IX requires colleges and universities to provide equality between men's
and women's athletic programs in proportion to their respective enrollments
with respect to the number of opportunities provided to men and women, the
overall quality of the programs, and the amount of scholarship aid awarded.'
The requirement of equity for both sexes in athletic programs will prevent col-
leges and universities from providing extra compensation in the form of athletic
scholarships to just male student-athletes.9 0 However, at least one scholar argues
that if member institutions treat their athletes as employees, then they would
not have to pay female athletes the same as male athletes."' Title IX's require-
ments prohibiting gender-based pay discrimination are generally interpreted as
coextensive with the anti-discrimination provisions that appear in the Equal Pay
Act of 1963 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Thus, disparate compensation of
employees playing revenue sports and employees playing female sports might
be permissible under Title IX as long as the employee athletes' job descriptions
for the revenue sport team involves greater skill, effort, and responsibility than
the female student-athletes' job descriptions. It is precisely this logic that, for
example, allowed the University of Connecticut to enter into a contract valued
at $13 million with Geno Auriemma, the coach of its women's basketball team,
and one valued at $17.9 million for Kevin Ollie, the coach of the men's basketball
team.1 92 Ollie's contract ran for five years starting June 1, 2016, and Aureimma's
for five years starting in April 2016. As a result, the Title IX problem might be
avoided by considering and treating the athletes in revenue sports as employees,
188 See, e.g., Hysaw v. Washburn Univ. ofTopeka, 690 F. Supp. 940 (D. Kan. 1987).
189 See 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.37(c), 106.41(c) (2018); A POLICY INTERPRETATION: TITLE IX AND INTERCOL-
LEGIATE ATHLETICS, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979).
190 See, e.g., Darren A. Heitner, Money and Sports: Economic Realities ofBeing an Athlete,
DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 166 (2012).
191 Marc Edelman, The Future ofAmateurism After Antitrust Scrutiny: Why a Win for the
Plaintiffs in the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation Will Not Lead to
the Demise Of College Sports, 92 OREGON L. REv. 1019, 1051-2 (2014) (Title IX's requirements
prohibiting gender-based pay discrimination are generally interpreted as coextensive with the
antidiscrimination provisions that appear in the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Thus, disparate compensation of male and female student-athletes would be permissible
under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 as long as the male student-athletes' job
descriptions involved greater skill, effort, and responsibility than the female student-athletes' job
descriptions.).
192 Paul Dolye, Auriemma, Ollie Under Contract at UConn Through 2021 for Close to $31M,




but, as pointed out, this raises other issues regarding what happens when the
athletes are considered employees. At any rate, the Title IX issue is one of the
significant obstacles that will have to be addressed before a plan to compensate
athletes beyond cost-of-attendance scholarships is put in place.
F. Conclusion
There is still more room within the amateur/education model for institutions to
improve the situation of athletes in revenue sports. For example, not all institutions
provide their athletes with multi-year and full cost-of-attendance scholarships.
Also, in June 2014, Indiana University athletic director Fred Glass announced
an athletic bill of rights for Indiana's athletes. Among the rights specified for
athletes is a lifetime degree commitment. Accordingly, Indiana University will
pay the cost of tuition for any athlete who wants to return to the university to
purse an undergraduate degree if they did not obtain one while participating as a
student-athlete.'93 The university also allows the athlete to choose any course of
study, major, or degree, with corresponding academic support services. 94 These
guarantees are improvements in the academic situation of athletes in revenue
sports, but still within the amateur/education model. Another improvement in
the situation of athletes is suggested by the statute recently adopted by the State
of Nebraska. The statute has established an administrative system for providing
medical and disability benefits to injured university athletes. 95
Nevertheless, what this demonstrates is that the criticisms of racial exploita-
tion of athletes participating in revenue sports has existed for a very long time.
And the NCAA and its member institutions, sometimes responding to public
criticism, sometimes under the threat of litigation, and sometimes based on their
own initiatives, have made strides toward achieving the maximum compensation
allowable for student-athletes in revenue sports under the amateur/education
model. It is also clear that these measures have had a positive impact on the
academic achievement of black male athletes in revenue sports. However, the
question remains, will maximizing the benefits of the athletes under the amateur/
education model be enough to rebut the criticisms of racial exploitation of the
current system, especially as revenues continue to climb?
IV. Critical Race Theory Perspective on the
Amateur/Education Model
Often, the charge of racial discrimination or racial exploitation conflates
two different concepts into a single misguided analysis. One form of racism
understands that individuals act for many different reasons, but it is only when
their actions are primarily motivated by a conscious desire to discriminate against
someone because they are a member of a racial or ethnic group that racism exists.
193 See STUDENT-ATHLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, INDIANA UNIVERSITY, http://iuhoosiers.com/docu-
ments/2015/5/21/aenrel 2013 14 misc non event BillOfRights.pdf
194 Id.
195 See NEB. REV. STAT. $85-106.5 (2016).
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The second form of racial discrimination focuses on the discriminatory effects
of given actions, policies, or procedures and is drawn from the recognition that
our society is composed of various racial and ethnic groups who live in very
different socio-economic conditions. The cause of these discriminatory effects
could be conscious racial discrimination, but could also result from unconscious
racism, the use of stereotypes, or institutional racism. When the charge is raised
that athletes in revenue sports are racially exploited, it is the latter concept of
discrimination that a person is asserting. The first section here will discuss these
two different concepts of racial discrimination. The second section will briefly
discuss the nature of the African-American experience that produced a collective
group whose individual experiences are connected to those of the entire group
and who are committed to an epic struggle against their continued oppression.
Considering the connected nature of the African-American experience in the
U.S., the actions and the images of black male athletes in revenue sports will
impact the experiences of all blacks. The third section will examine how media
images of black males in revenue sports helps to sustain some of the most harmful
negative stereotypes that blacks encounter.
A. Two Types of Racial Discrimination
Despite the declaration of many pundits that the U.S. has already become a post-
racial society,'96 there are still huge racial and ethnic disparities in important
socioeconomic conditions. The median household income of blacks in 2016 was
$39,490, which was only 60.7% of white family income and 48.5% of Asian
family income.'9 7 With respect to per capita earnings, the figure for blacks of
$22,861 was only 65% of white and 63% of Asian per capita income. 98 The 2016
unemployment rates for blacks (8.40o) was more than twice that of Asians (3.60o),
nearly twice that of whites (4.30o), and significantly higher than that of Hispanics
(4.70o).'9 A much larger percentage of blacks also live in poverty. The poverty
rate in the Black Community stands at 27.2%, in contrast to Hispanics at 25.6%,
196 See, e.g., Peter Wallsten, Election 2008: The Presidential Vote/News Analysis, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 5, 2008), at 11; Craig Gordon, Analysis: How Obama Won It, NEWSDAY (Nov. 5, 2008), at
W04; Kevin Sack, After Decades, a Time to Reap, N. Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2008), at Al; John B. Judis,
It'sA Wrap: The 2008 Campaign, L. A. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2008), at 34.
197 Black family income was also less than that of Hispanic household income ($47,675). In
contrast, white non-Hispanic household income was $65,041 and Asian household income was
$81,431. Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Cover in the United States: 2016, U.S. CENSUS Bu-
REAU (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.census.aov/newsroom/oress-releases/2017/income-povery.html.
198 Historical Income Tables: People, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU tbl.P-1, httns://www.census.aov/
data/tables/time-series/demo/income-povertv/historical-income-people.html. Per capita income
for blacks is actually higher than the per capita income of Hispanics of $20,430. The per capita
income for whites is $35,168. For Asians, it is $36,309.
199 BLS Reports Report 1044 Labor Force Characteristics by Race and Ethnicity, 2016, U.S. Bu-




Asians at 11.7%, and whites at 9.9%.'20 The disparities in poverty rates are even
higher for blacks under the age of 18. Over a third of black children, 36.7%, live
below the poverty line, in contrast to Hispanics at 33.8%, whites at 18.5%, and
Asians at 13.8%.201 Beyond racial differences in income levels, black families
also have considerably less accumulated wealth than white families. According
to a September 2017 report issued by Prosperity Now and the Institute for Policy
Studies, in 2016 the average white family possessed $134,000 in wealth, compared
to $11,000 for the average black family.202 Thus, the average white family was
more than 12 times wealthier than the average black family. While blacks with
college degrees have more net worth, the wealth gap is considerably greater and
the ratio is about the same. According to a 2016 report on educational attainment,
the wealth gap between blacks and whites over the age of 25 with college degrees
has remained stable for decades. 203 In fact, " [w]hite households headed by someone
with a college degree have a median wealth of $301,300 compared to college-
educated black households, which have a median wealth of $26,300."204
In a groundbreaking 40-year-old article, Alan Freeman introduced two dif-
ferent conceptions of racial discrimination. 2 0 5 Freeman's article argued that the
distinction between defining discrimination in terms of the intent of the actor,
as opposed to effects of the actions, represents a distinction between the perpe-
trator's perspective of discrimination as opposed to the victim's perspective. As
Freeman noted in his article, from the perpetrator's perspective, racial discrimi-
nation is aberrational and the product of irrational victims who stubbornly refuse
to acknowledge the individuality of others. The goal of a struggle against racism
from this perspective is to stop bad actors from taking actions motivated by racial
animus. From the victim's perspective, racism is ubiquitous throughout society
because racial disparities in significant socio-economic conditions exist in the
most important determinants of human flourishing. It is important to realize that
the victim in the context of determining whether the amateur/education model
is racially exploitive is the entire Black Community-not just a collection of
individual blacks who are recruited because they have special athletic abilities.
200 Poverty Status ofPeople, by Age, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1959 to 2016, U.S. CENSUS Bu-
REAU tbl.3, https://www.census.aov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-povertv/historical-over-
ty-people.html.
201 Poverty Status ofPeople by Family Relationship, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1959 to 2016,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU tbl.2, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-povertv/
historical-poverty-people.htmI.
202 PROSPERITY Now AND THE INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES, THE ROAD TO ZERO WEALTH (2017),
https://prosperitvnow.org/files/PDFs/road to zero wealth.pdf.
203 Camille L. Ryan and Kurt Bauman, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES: 2015 (2016), https://www.census.aov/content/dam/Census/librarv/publica-
tions/2016/demo/n20-578.pdf.
204 Tanzine Vega, Blacks Still Far Behind Whites in Wealth and Income, CNN MONEY (June 27,
2017), http://monev.cnn.com/2016/06/27/news/economy/racial-wealth-aan-blacks-whites/index.
html.
205 Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law: A Criti-
cal Review ofSupreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978).
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From the perspective of the perpetrator, racism is viewed as generally
aberrational and isolated. Thus, racial and ethnic statistics are of little use in
determining its existence. For victims of racial discrimination, however, the
elimination of racism and racial discrimination is accompanied by significant
improvements in socio-economic conditions of life that were associated with
racial discrimination. These changes include better employment opportunities,
more income, less poverty, more wealth, and greater educational attainment.
Thus, the racial disparities noted in important socio-economic conditions repre-
sent ways in which to measure the continued influence of racial discrimination.
If discriminatory intent is used as the definition of racial discrimination or
racial exploitation, then it is obvious that the NCAA's rules governing amateur-
ism are not discriminatory. Few, if any, commentators or legal scholars would
argue that the NCAA adopted or maintains its rules and regulations embracing
the principal of amateurism as a result of a conscious desire to discriminate
against athletes who happen to be black males.
When commentators are implying that the NCAA's embrace of amateurism
for revenue sports is racially discriminatory or racially exploitive, they have
to have in mind a different concept of racism than discriminatory intent. That
concept must look beyond the intent of the NCAA and its member institutions to
the effects of the application of the principal of amateurism on blacks. However,
once we start to focus on the effects of amateurisms, the focus should no longer
be limited to just the interest of a few elite black athletes in FB S football or men's
basketball. Rather, the consideration should be about the interest of the entire
Black Community. For instance, there are about 432 four- or five-star high school
recruits out of 300,000 who play high school football. 206 From the standpoint of
the Black Community, the focus is not just on the small number of four- and five-
star recruits but all of those high school students in the Black Community who
play football. More importantly, however, this new point of view suggests that
there are plenty of other measures that the NCAA and its member institutions
could institute to assist the Black Community in increasing college attendance
and graduation rates that would help to rebut any assertion that the application of
the amateur/education model to revenue sports is racially discriminatory.
B. The Nature of the African-American Experience in the
United States
The central feature of the African-American experience in the United States is
the treatment of a group of individuals classified by their race as involuntary
members of a historically oppressed racial group. As noted black scholar W.E.B.
DuBois summarized it, "The So called Negro group ... while it is in no sense
absolutely set off physically from its fellow Americans, has nevertheless a
strong, hereditary cultural unity born of slavery, common suffering, prolonged
proscription, and curtailment of political and civil rights. ... Prolonged policies of
206 Alex Kirshner, This Is How Rare It Is to Be a Blue-chip College Football Recruit, SB NATION




segregation and discrimination have involuntarily welded the mass almost into a
nation within a nation." 207
Race continues to be the dominant feature of the present and past experi-
ences of African-Americans in the United States. The experience, however, has
two different aspects. One aspect involved what it means to be a victim of racial
discrimination. With regard to the descendants of the soil of Africa, for much of
America's history, dominant American culture was deeply invested in notions of
white (or at least Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic) superiority. Thus, dominant Ameri-
can cultural attitudes had clear concepts of what it meant to be black and imposed
those notions on dark-skinned people. Black people have long been negatively ste-
reotyped. For example, the first edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica published
in 1798 stated that black people are prone to "idleness, treachery, revenge, cruelty,
impudence, stealing, lying, debauchery, nastiness and intemperance." 2 08 Within
this aspect of the experience of being black, African-Americans are viewed as
passive objects completely subjected to domination, rather than as people with
their own wills, hopes, and desires, who influence their own destiny. Because this
aspect presupposed that blacks were inferior or substandard in some important
way to whites, it obscured the basic injustice of the discriminatory treatment that
blacks experienced throughout American history. Instead, the belief in the infe-
riority of blacks made their subjugation appear as the result of the natural order
of things. Thus, one aspect of the experience of historical discrimination is the
experience of what it means to be "raced" or branded as inferior.209
Against the background of racial domination, however, the descendants of
the sons and daughters of the soil of Africa in the U.S. developed a counter-dis-
course to how mainstream American society viewed and treated them, the central
feature of which was the collective struggle against their racial oppression. As
James Forman stated about this aspect of the African-American experience, "our
basic history is one of resistance." 2 1 0 Commenting on this, Mari Matsuda noted
that "Black Americans, the paradigmatic victim group of our history, have turned
the Bible and the Constitution into texts of liberation." 211 From the perspective
of the counter-discourse, blacks are not viewed as inferior, but as oppressed.
Thus, in contrast to the "raced" aspect of the historical experience of blacks was
207 W.E.B. DuBois, Three Centuries ofDiscrimination, THE CRISIS 54, 362-63 (1947).
20 The first edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica in 1798 used this to define "Negroes." See
Kevin Brown, RACE, LAW AND EDUCATION IN THE POST-DESEGREGATION ERA 66 (2005).
209 See, e.g., Kendall Thomas, Comment, Frontiers ofLegal Thought Conference, Duke Law
School (Jan. 26, 1990), quoted in Charles R. Lawrence III, IfHe Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L. J. 431, in Mari J. Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence III,
Richard Delgado and Kimberle W. Crenshaw, WORDS THAT WOUND 53, 61 (1993); see also D. Mar-
vin Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self 82 GEO. L. J. 437 (1993)
(arguing that racial categories are neither objective nor natural, but ideological and constructed. In
these terms race is not so much a category but a practice: people are raced).
210 See Stephen Tuck, WE AIN'T WHAT WE OUGHT TO BE: THE BLACK FREEDOM STRUGGLE FROM
EMANCIPATION TO OBAMA 2 (2010).
2" Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 323, 335 (1987).
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the active experience of a group who did not control the visible reins of power,
but still served as the architects of their own struggles against their oppression.
This struggle against oppression was limited by and responsive to the conditions
imposed on blacks by the dominant community. Nevertheless, this commitment
to the struggle against racial oppression and its concomitant sacrifice of the in-
terest of the individual for the advancement of the Black Community is as much
a part of the historical experience of blacks in the U.S. as the experience of being
victims of racial oppression.
There are many historical examples of the sacrifice of members of the Black
Community for the betterment of the entire Community. In fact, major advances
of the Black Community tend to result only from huge sacrifices of thousands
of individual blacks. One example is the remarkable efforts of black people to
free themselves during the Civil War. Official statistics show that almost 179,000
black soldiers served in the Union army, 7,122 of whom were officers. 212 By the
end of the Civil War, African-Americans comprised 10% of the Union's armed
forces. An additional 29,000 blacks served as sailors, comprising 25% of Union
seamen. 213 The black troops also paid a heavy price during the Civil War that
led to the abolition of slavery, suffering a disproportionately large number of
casualties. Approximately 37,300 blacks died during the conflict, amounting to
more than 10% of the Union war deaths. 2 14 President Abraham Lincoln often em-
phasized the significance of the black soldiers to the Union's war effort. Lincoln
candidly noted that without the black troops, no administration could have saved
the Union. 2 15 However, the black troops were not fighting in the Civil War just to
preserve the Union. They were fighting to liberate the entire Black Community
from slavery. Their sacrifice is better explained as part of a collective effort to
free their people than to assure that the Union was perpetual.
During America's long years of fighting against legally entrenched segrega-
tion of America's public schools, the interests of many individuals in the Black
Community were sacrificed. For example, between 1954 and 1972, more than
70,000 black teachers lost their jobs in the Southern and Border States. 216 Also,
212 James M. McPherson, THE NEGRO'S CIVIL WAR: How AMERICAN BLACKS FELT & ACTED DURING
THE WAR FOR THE UNION 241 (1991).
213 Maulana Karenga, INTRODUCTION To BLACK STUDIES 144 (2d ed. 1993).
214 McPherson, supra note 213.
215 See Letter to Charles D. Robinson, August 17, 1864, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 499-501 (Ed. Roy P. Basler 1953).
216 See Samuel B. Etheridge, Impact ofthe 1954 Brown v. Topeka Board ofEducation Decision
on Black Educators, 30 THE NEGRO EDUC. REV. 213, 223-4 (1979). Another source put the number
at more than 31,000 in Southern and Border States. Smith and Smith, Desegregation in the South
and the Demise ofthe Black Educator, 20 J. Soc. & BEHAV. SCI. 28-40 (1974).
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96% of the African-American principals lost their jobs due to racial integration
in North Carolina, 90% in Kentucky and Arkansas, 80% in Alabama, 78% in
Virginia, and 77% in South Carolina and Tennessee.2 17 Beyond the sacrifices of
black teachers and administrators were the sacrifices of black elementary and
secondary students whose education was completely disrupted by the efforts to
desegregate American public education.218
To draw a closer analogy to elite black male athletes in revenue sports, we
could consider the impact of affirmative action policies at selective colleges and
universities. We often hear assertions that certain blacks who would be admitted
into selective higher education programs without the benefit of affirmative action
are having their academic accomplishments devalued by these programs.2 19 This
position is visible in the comments made in December 2015 by the late Supreme
Court Justice Antonio Scalia during oral arguments for the last affirmative action
decision of the Court in which he participated. Justice Scalia suggested that Af-
rican-American students on affirmative action would do better if they attended
"a less-advanced school, a less -- a slower-track school where they do well." 220
For the ones who were not on affirmative action, their accomplishments were
being tainted by their "less qualified" brethren. Yet, the history of affirmative
action measures is that they have significantly increased the number of black
lawyers, doctors, business executives, and other professionals. Thus, regardless
of whether a few blacks have been harmed by affirmative action, the program has
been significant in helping to create tens of thousands of black lawyers, doctors,
dentists, college professors, and business executives.
217 Displacement and Present Status ofBiack School Principals in Desegregated School Dis-
tricts: Hearings before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (statement of Benjamin Epstein). In addition, Epstein also testified that
50% of the African-American principals lost their jobs in Georgia and 30% did so in Maryland. Id.
21 For example, on Prince Edward County, Virginia, many black school children went without
education for five years, as part of the effort to compel the integration of the public schools there.
The Little Rock Nine that integrated Little Rock's Central High School received a rude intro-
duction when they enrolled in the high school. And black students seeking to desegregate public
schools encountered this rude experience all over the country. Also, black students disproportion-
ately started their school days earlier and ended them later than their white counterparts because
they bore the brunt of school bussing for the purpose of desegregation. See Kevin Brown, RACE,
LAW AND EDUCATION IN THE POST-DESEGREGATION ERA: FOUR PERSPECTIVES ON DESEGREGATION AND
RESEGREGATION 167-174 (2005).
219 See, e.g., Stephen Carter, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991).
2" See, e.g., Yanan Wang, Morning Mix Where Justice Scalia Got the Idea That African Amer-
icansMight Be Better Offat 'Slower-Track' Universities, WASH. (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/mornin-mix/wp/2015/12/10/where-justice-scalias-got-the-idea-that-
african-americans-might-be-better-off-at-slower-track-universities/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
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C. Impact of Stereotypical Images of Black Male Athletes on the
Black Community
Stereotypes of groups are the product of consistent association of its members with
specific traits. The mass media helps to create and perpetuate these stereotypes;
thus, media images of blacks can influence perceptions of the American public of
all black people.22 ' As the NCAA said in the first sentence of its opening statement
in Alston v. NC4A case, "College football and basketball are part of the fabric
of American life. These sports are wildly popular, enjoyed by millions."222 Since
sports permeates American culture, especially FBS football and men's basketball,
the American public is often exposed to images of black sports figures. For
example, while the television audience for the January 7, 2019, College Football
Playoff national championship game on ESPN, in which Clemson blew out
Alabama 44-16, was its lowest in the five years of the game, some 25.2 million
people watched it.223 And even though the viewership for the 2018 NCAA men's
basketball championship game between Michigan and Villanova saw a 28% dip
from the 2017 game, the game averaged 16.5 million viewers. 224
Black athletes playing revenue sports are inherently connected to the Black
Community; and their conduct both benefits and disadvantages other blacks in
numerous ways. As one researcher put it, media images of sports "have played a
central role in biologising black performance via their constant use of animalistic
similes to describe black athletes." 225 Among the most destructive racial stereo-
types of black males that sports images reinforce are that they may be physically
gifted, but are lacking the necessary mental skills and intelligence needed for
elite occupations. 226 Studies point to the fact that televised male sports promote
221 See, e.g., Psychological Reactions to Crime News Portrayals ofBlack Criminals: Understand-
ing the Moderating Roles ofPrior News Viewing and Stereotype Endorsement. COMMUNICATION
MONOGRAPHS, 73, 162-187; Black Criminals and White Officers: The Effects ofRacially Misrepre-
senting Law Breakers and Law Defenders on Television News. MEDIA PSYCHOLOGY, 10, 270-291;
Dana Mastro (2009), Effects ofRacial and Ethnic Stereotyping. In J. Bryant and M. B. Oliver
(Eds.), MEDIA EFFECTS: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH (3rd ed., pp. 325-341). New York, NY:
Routledge; Dana Mastro and Maria Kopacz (2006), Media Representations ofRace, Prototypical-
ity, and Policy Reasoning: An Application ofSelf-Categorization Theory. JOURNAL OF BROADCAST-
ING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA, 50, 305-322.
2 See In Re National Collegiate Athletic Association Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Liti-
gation, Case 4:14-md-02541-CW Document 993 Filed 08/27/18 Page 4 of 59
223 Ralph D. Russo, Clemson Blowout Draws Lowest TVRatings for a CFP Title Game, WASHING-
TON POST (Jan. 8, 2019) https://www.washinatonpost.com/sports/collees/clemson-blowout-draws-
lowest-tv-ratings-for-cfp-title-game/2019/01/08/26d2c4c2-136d-11e9-ab79-30cd4f7926f2 story.
html?utm term=.1313f2666327.
224 Joe Otterson, NCAA Championship Game Viewership Drops 28% From 2017, VARIETY (Apr. 3,
2018) https://variety.com/2018/tv/news/2018-ncaa-championship-game-ratins-1202742895/
225 Ben Carrington, Fear of a Black Athlete: Masculinity, Politics and the Body, NEW FORMATIONS,
45, 91-110 (2001/2).
226 Harry Edwards, The Black "Dumb Jock": An American Sports Tragedy, COLLEGE BOARD REV.,
N131, 8-13 (Spr. 1984). For a listing of this literature see Andrew Grainger, Joshua I. Newman, and
David L. Andrews, Sport, the Media, and the Construction ofRace in HANDBOOK OF SPORTS AND
MEDIA 452 (2006).
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these stereotypical and common sense notions of black males. For example,
according to Lapchick's 2017 Racial and Gender Report Card: College Sports,
75% of men's basketball and 86.9% of football head coaches in Division I were
white. 227 Thus, as America watches college football or basketbal games, it is of-
ten introduced to the specter of a football team on the field or basketball team on
the court where a majority of the players are black, but the person in charge of the
intellectual aspect of the game is white. 228 Given the over-representation of black
athletes in revenue sports, the paucity of black head coaches in FBS football and
men's basketball reaffirms the notion that blacks are not as intelligent.
One of the most destructive stereotypes of blacks, particularly males, is that
that they are aggressive, dangerous predators, and prone to violence. As law pro-
fessor Frank Cooper illuminated, there is a longstanding cultural image of black
men that includes the "Bad Black Man." 229 It is an image that existed during
slavery in the image of the black men as beasts of the field. Black men of all
classes have been victimized by these stereotypes. 230 Several studies have found
that the representations of black athletes reinforce this view of black males. 231
Because of their fame and popularity, the off-field activities of athletes in reve-
nue sports receives substantial media coverage. Much of America is treated to
images of black college players engaged in violent and criminal acts, like Florida
State quarterback De'Andre Johnson and University of Oklahoma running back
Joe Mixon punching their girlfriends, or other well-known college star athletes
suspected of criminal activities like Lawrence Phillips, Maurice Clarett, and
Darrell Williams. An ESPN Outside the Lines story in 2015 discussed the results
of a study that examined more than 2,000 documents related to criminal activity
of basketball and football players at 10 universities with major collegiate sports
programs (Auburn, Florida, Florida State, Michigan State, Missouri, Notre
Dame, Oklahoma State, Oregon State, Texas A&M, and Wisconsin). According
to their story, in half the programs at least 15% of the athletes were involved in
some kind of criminal activity. 23 2
27 See Richard Lapchick Et Al., Univ. Cent. Of Fla. Inst. for Diversity And Ethics
in Sport, THE 2017 RACIAL AND GENDER REPORT CARD: COLLEGE SPORT 2 (2017), htta.//
nebula.wsime.com/5665825afd75728dcOc45b52ae6c412d?AccessKevld=DAC3A56D-
8FB782449D2A&disposition=0&alloworigin=1.
2" Only 7.6% of the head coaches in Division I football were African-Americans in 2016-17 and
African-Americans held only 22.3% of head coaching positions in men's basketball. Id.
229 See generally Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, As-
similation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853, 857-58 (2006).
230 Consider, for example, the arrest of African-American Harvard professor Henry Louis Gates,
Jr. while he attempted to open his front door. Krissah Thompson, Arrest ofHarvard's Henry Louis
Gates Jr. Was Avoidable, Report Says, WASH. POST (June 30, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/30/AR2010063001356.html.
231 For a listing of this literature, see Sport, the Media, and the Construction ofRace in HAND-
BOOK OF SPORTS AND 454 (2006).
232 Two decades ago, a study showed that 20% of the members of the NFL had been charged with
a serious crime. See Jeff Benedict and Don Yaeger, PROS AND CONS: THE CRIMINALS WHO PLAY THE
NFL (1998). See also, David Leonard, A World of Criminals or a Media Construction? Race, Gen-
der, Celebrity, and the Athlete/Criminal Discourse in HANDBOOK OF SPORTS AND MEDIA 524 (2006).
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Elite athletes in college sports are also often portrayed as self-centered,
arrogant, mercenary, deviant, drug abusers, and generally misbehaving. Beyond
the off-field activities, football and basketball, but especially football, are vio-
lent games. Football is a "combat sport" centered on high levels of aggression
and violence. Injuries in the sport are not so much accidents or violations, but
incorporated as part of the game.233 Thus, just watching college football exposes
Americans on a weekly basis every autumn to images of black males engaged
in a very violent activity. These views of black males on the sports field provide
constant fuel to sustain the stereotype that black athletes are naturally threaten-
ing and prone to violent conduct.234
The aforementioned discussion is not intended to cast blame of black male
athletes in revenue sports. The point is to make the connection between them and
our society's negative impressions of blacks. Such media attention of black male
athletes contributes to negative stereotypes of black people, especially black
males. As Blackstone has noted, "there is a connection between black male sports
athletes and the American stereotypical image that black males are threatening
characters." Another commentator stated, "Unfortunately, the sports media has
perpetuated an image of African American athletes as dangerous criminals. This
image has been fashioned through the media's racialized reporting of athlete
crime, and the media's portrayal of African American athletes as bestial, intel-
lectually inferior, beings." 235
One place where our society's images of black males as prone to aggressive
and criminal behavior manifests itself is in the mass incarceration of black males
in America's jails and prisons. As college sports gained in popularity, the num-
ber of black males entangled with the criminal justice system exploded. Due in
no small part to the War on Drugs, between 1980 and 2013, the combined U.S.
prison population in state and federal institutions increased five times from about
300,000 to more than 1.5 million.236 According to the U.S. Bureau of Justice in
2014, about 539,500 blacks in the U.S. were in either state or federal prisons. They
made up approximately 35.7% of all prisoners. When you add that to the 263,800
blacks who on average are in local jails, there are over 800,000 blacks behind bars
at any given time in the U.S. Estimates indicate that 32.2% of African-American
males will spend part of their life in prison, versus 17.2% of Hispanic males and
5.9% of white males. Wisconsin sociology professor Pamela Oliver further points
233 Michael Messner, When Bodies are Weapons: Masculinity and Violence in Sport, 25 INTERNA-
TIONAL REVIEW FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF SPORT 203-220 (1990).
234 For a listing of this literature, see Andrew Grainger, Joshua I. Newman, David L. Andrews,
and David Leonard, A World of Criminals or a Media Construction? Race, Gender, Celebrity, and
the Athlete/Criminal Discourse in HANDBOOK OF SPORTS AND MEDIA 454 (2006).
235 Jake James Cullen Evans, A Criminal Justice System Without Justice: The News Media, Sports
Media, & Rap's Influence on Racial Crime Disparities, 5 UNIV. MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE REV.
117, 123 (2015)
236 Michelle Alexander, THE NEW JIM CROW 6 (2014); see generally E. Ann Carson, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2013 1 (2014), http://www.bis.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.vdf
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out that, "about a third of African American men are under the supervision of
the criminal justice system, and about 12% of African American men in their
20s and 30s are incarcerated." In fact, the U.S. imprisons a larger percentage of
blacks than South Africa did during the height of apartheid. 237
The performance of black male athletes in revenue-generating sports may
have other less obvious effects on other blacks in the criminal justice system. A
study by Louisiana State University ("LSU") economics professors Ozkan Eran
and Naci Mocan looked at decisions rendered by judges that graduated from
LSU in juvenile courts in Louisiana between 1996 and 2012.238 They found that
when LSU won a football game it was supposed to win or lost a football game
it was supposed to lose, there was no effect on the sentences that these judges
meted out to black males. However, when LSU was upset, the judges imposed
longer sentences on the black males who appeared in front of them the following
week. It was as if the judges were taking some of their frustrations about the
LSU football team out on black male adolescents in front of them. The study also
found that an LSU upset win did not benefit black males who appeared in front
of these judges.
V. Programs and Policies to Help the Black Community
As previously stated, the purpose of this article is to reformulate the debate
about whether the amateur/education model applied to the revenue sports of FB S
football and men's basketball is racially exploitive by focusing on the interest
of the entire Black Community. In doing so, we will suggest that some of the
revenues generated by FBS football and men's basketball be devoted to the
funding and creation of programs that are directed toward increasing the college
attendance and graduation rates of the Black Community. The primary reason to
suggest that these programs focus on college attendance and participation rates
is to take advantage of the existing educational expertise that the NCAA and its
member institutions possess. While black male student-athletes often encounter
negative stereotypes that view them as dumb jocks, these negative stereotypes
also negatively impact the educational experiences of the black students on
their campuses. 239 Thus, it is likely that all the black students on the campuses
of revenue sports programs have to fight the negative stereotypes that sports
coverage contributes to perpetuating.
There are other reasons that the programs and policies we suggest should
focus on the college attendance and graduation rates of blacks. Substantial racial
and ethnic gaps exist in terms of educational achievement in the U.S. A 2013
report by the National Center on Education Statistics noted that, for freshmen
237 See, Ta-Nehisi Coates, Mapping the New Jim Crow, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 17, 2014) (quoting
Michelle Alexander), httns://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/10/mapina-the-new-jim-
crow/381617/.
238 Ozkan Eran and Naci Mocan, (2016). EmotionalJudges and Unlucky Juveniles. NBER Work-
ing Paper 22611, https://www.nber.org/apers/w22611.
239 See, e.g., Shaun Harper, Black Male College Achievers and Resistant Responses to Racist Ste-
reotypes at Predominantly White Colleges and Universities, 85 HARV. EDUC. REV 614 (2015).
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entering high school in 2006 and due to graduate in 2010, the number of students
able to graduate in four years varied substantially for the different racial groups.
Only 66.1% of blacks graduated in four years, compared with 69.1% for Native
Americans, 71.4% for Hispanic, 83.0% for whites, and 93.5% for Asians. 2 4 0 Ac-
cording to a Pew Research Center report in 2014, while blacks made up 16% of
high school graduates, they made up only 14% of students enrolled in college.
But since blacks are much more likely to go to two-year and community colleges,
they made up only 9% of those with bachelor degrees or higher.241 Also, the
percentage of those with college degrees in 2017 varies substantially among the
racial/ethnic groups. Thus, whereas 2 4 .3 % of blacks over the age of 25 have
a college degree, 38.1% of whites and 55.4% of Asians have obtained such a
degree. 242 And these racial gaps in college attendance and obtaining degrees has
persisted for many years. For example, in 1975, 6.4% of blacks over the age of 25
had college degrees compared to 14.9% of whites. 2 4 3
Blacks also tend to begin pursuing their higher educational credentials at
a later date than members of other racial/ethnic groups. Whereas over 80% of
Asians, whites, and Latinos start college at age 20 or younger, only 69% of blacks
do. 244 Additionally, only 38% of blacks who started college in 2010 completed
a certificate or degree within six years, compared to 6 3 .2 % of Asians, 6 2% of
whites, and 4 5 .8 % of Latinos. 245 Blacks also tend to borrow more money to
graduate with a bachelor's degree than any other group due to the lower levels
of income and wealth in the Black Community. While only 14% of blacks have
no student debt when they graduate with a bachelor's degree, almost a third of
them have accrued more than $40,000 in student debt. In contrast, the respective
percentages for Asians are 43% and 7%, for whites 32% and 16%, and for Latinos
27% and 17%.246 Financial difficulties help to explain why it often takes blacks
240 Robert Stillwell and Jennifer Stable, U.S. Department Of Education, PUBLIC SCHOOL GRAD-
UATES AND DROPOUTS FROM THE COMMON CORE OF DATA: SCHOOL YEAR 2009 -10: FIRST LOOK
(PROVISIONAL DATA) 4 (2013). These high school graduation rates are based on receipt of a diploma.
Therefore, they exclude from high school graduates those that only receive a certificate of comple-
tion or its equivalent.
241 Jens Manuel Krogstad and Richard Fry, More Hispanics, Blacks Enrolling in College, But Lag
in Bachelor's Degrees, PEW RESEARCH CENTER: FACT TANK (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.pewre-
search.org/fact-tank/2014/04/24/more-hispanics-blacks-enrolline-in-college-but-lag-in-bachelors-
degrees
242 For Hispanic/Latinos, the percentage is only 17.2%. See Digest of Educational Statistics, Na-
tional Center for Educational Statistics, Rates ofHigh School Completion and Bachelor's Degree
AttainmentAmong Persons Age 25 and Over, by Race/Ethnicity and Sex: Selected Years, 1910
through 2017, Table 104.10, https://nces.ed.2ov/programs/digest/dl7/tables/dtl7 104.10.asp
243 Id.
244 Doug Shapiro et al., SIGNATURE 12 SUPPLEMENT: COMPLETING COLLEGE: A NATIONAL VIEW OF
STUDENT ATTAINMENT RATES BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 7 fig.3 (2017), httns://nscresearchcenter.ore/
wp-content/uploads/Signaturel2-RaceEthnicity.pdf.
245 Id. at 10, fig.6.




longer to finish a college degree. Almost 30% of blacks take 10 years or longer,
which is more than twice the percentage of Asians, 50% more than whites, and
more than Latinos.247
The urgency for devoting proceeds from revenue sports to increase the college
participation and graduation rates of blacks may be even more important due to the
changing nature of the black college athlete in these sports. Most Americans still
have the vision of poor urban inner-city blacks dominating college football and
basketball. However, the rising academic requirements of college sports and the
need to enroll youngsters in specialized athletic programs well before the time they
reach college may be having the effect of substantially reducing the percentage of
first-generation and poor blacks who receive athletic scholarships. In an article
titled, "The Gentrification of College Sports," Thomas Ferry reveals that starting
in 2010, the NCAA began to ask college athletes whether they were first-generation
college attendees as part of a little-known GOALS Study. The results of the study
suggested that between 2010 and 2015, most sports are seeing a drop in first-gen-
eration athletes. As of 2015, the percentage of freshmen who were first-generation
at all of the nation's four-year colleges was 17.2%. In contrast, only 14.2% of all
Division I athletes are first generation; the figure was 19% for Division I basketball
and 23% for FBS football. 248 The figures for these two sports, however, are down
nine percentage points and three percentage points, respectively, in five years.
However, due to the concerns about the risk of CTE from playing football, it is
likely that the percentage of low-income players will increase.
Further, increasing the college attendance and graduation rates of blacks
would successfully combat the racial income and wealth gaps that exist in the
U.S. The income gaps between those with college degrees compared to high
school diplomas have grown substantially over the past 50 years. 24 9 Ron Haskins
at the Brookings Institute points out that college education is also the best hedge
that America's poorest people have to break the cycle of poverty. For the children
of those in the bottom quintile of income, if they finish college only 16% will end
up in the bottom quintile, whereas if they do not 45% will.250
Among the programs that the NCAA and its member institutions could
institute or fund are ones that could support the other non-athlete black students
on their campuses. This realization has not gone unnoticed by commentators.
Harper has called on colleges and universities to extend targeted academic advis-
ing, tutoring, clubs, and activities, like skills development resources, structured
study spaces, alumni networks, and committed institutional agents, to black men
who were not athletes in order to improve their academic success and college
247 For Asians, 14% take at least 10 years. For whites and Latinos, the comparison figures are 17%
and 20%, respectively. Id.
248 See Thomas Ferry, The Gentrification of College Sports, https://theundefeated.com/features/
gentrification-of-ncaa-division-1-college-basketball/
249 Roy Haskins, Education and Economic Mobility, in GETTING AHEAD OR LOSING GROUND: Eco-
NOMIC MOBILITY IN AMERICA (Eds. Julia B. Isaac, Isabel V. Sawhill, and Roy Haskins, 2008), htthi//
www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/reports/2008/2/economic-mobility-sawhill/02 eco-
nomic mobility sawhill ch8.pdf.
250 Id. at 5, fig.6.
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completion rates.25' He also proposes that colleges and universities provide more
financial aid to non-student-athlete black males in order to reduce the number of
hours they have to work. Thus, he implies that among other ways the NCAA and
its member institutions can respond to the charge of exploitation of black male
athletes in revenue-generating sports is to provide more academic assistance to
black male students who are not athletes at the universities.
Beyond instituting policies and programs to improve the graduation rates
of blacks at Division I institutions, the NCAA and its member institutions could
institute more pre-college programs in urban or rural school districts with large
populations of black students. For example, the NCAA and its member institu-
tions could establish or expand programs that provide SAT and ACT preparation
courses in high schools with a high concentration of black students. They could
provide college counselors or financial aid advisors who would help ensure that
students are aware of the demands and expectations for college and the potential
resources available for funding their education. The NCAA and its member
institutions could create scholarship programs to assist students who enroll on
their campuses after participating in an institution's pre-college program. These
institutions could create or expand mentorship programs that connect students,
staff, or faculty to pre-college students to provide those students with the encour-
agement, resources, and necessary know-how to navigate the college application
process. In short, the types of programs can vary from institution to institution,
but the common theme is to increase the number of blacks who are attending and
graduating from Division I colleges and universities.
VI. Conclusion
The amateur/education model provides an acceptable way to look at college
sports from the perspective of all athletes playing college sports. However, its
application to the primary revenue sports of FB S football and men's basketball
may present another issue. Where the primary beneficiaries of non-revenue
sports are the athletes who participate, the same cannot be said for revenue
sports. For many of the Division I institutions with these sports, their income
provides the necessary revenue to cover not only the scholarships for athletes in
revenue sports, but to also cover the expenses of the entire athletic department,
including those related to non-revenue sports. The funds produced by revenue
sports also pays for the athletic facilities for their own sports, which increasingly
include luxury boxes for cherished university officials and alums. Some colleges
and universities even use monies generated by FBS football and men's basketball
to subsidize general university expenses. As a result, the current structure of
college sports that applies the amateur/education model to revenue sports has
created a situation where many other interested groups are profiting from the toil
of these athletes.
The problematic nature of applying the amateur/education model to the
revenue sports is exacerbated when we realize that the majority of elite athletes
in FBS football and men's basketball are black males. Added to the concerns
25 HARPER, supra note 18, at 16-17.
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about whether the amateur/education model is suitabile for revenue sports is the
argument that its application is potentially racially exploitive because the interest
of black male athletes are being sacrificed at the altar of their institutions for the
benefit of so many others. For more than 30 years, commentators have pointed to
the racial exploitation of college sports.
For those who support the application of the amateur/education model to
revenue sports, they believe that if there are any inadequacies in the current
system, they can be cured by the colleges doing more to improve the educational
achievement of the student-athlete. The problem for this group is twofold. First,
over the past 35 years, the NCAA and its member institutions have implemented
numerous changes intending to improve the educational attainment of all ath-
letes, especially black males in revenue sports. These measures have had their
intended effects and have led to substantial improvements in the academic suc-
cess of black males in revenue sports. Second, the revenues generated by college
sports continues to increase. Thus, as colleges and universities are running out
of room to substantially improve the academic performance of their black male
athletes in revenue sports, the funds that those athletes generate continues to
grow. Regardless of how you view the current system, what view will people
have about it in another 10 to 20 years? Those who believe that the athletes should
receive more compensation generally suggest that college sports abandon the
amateur/education model. However, there are several legal obstacles involved
with paying the athletes for playing their sport. Doing so could very well destroy
college sports as we know it. This is the debate that has raged for more than 30
years. The common denominator of both sides is that they each view the issue
with the assumption that the funds generated by revenue sports must be split only
between the athletes or the NCAA and its member institutions.
To raise the question of whether the application of the amateur/education
model to revenue sports is racially exploitive requires that we have a definition
of racism. One form of racism defines it as when a person's actions are primarily
motivated by a conscious desire to discriminate against someone because they
are a member of a racial or ethnic group. This is the predominant legal definition
of racism. Under this understanding, racism only exists when a person's actions
are primarily motivated by discriminatory intent. The second form of racial dis-
crimination focuses not on the motives of the actor, but the discriminatory effects
of given actions, policies, or procedures. It is drawn from a recognition that due
to our country's legacy of racial discrimination, we live in a society composed
of various racial and ethnic groups who live in very different socio-economic
conditions. The cause of these discriminatory effects could be conscious racial
discrimination, but could also result from unconscious racism, the use of stereo-
types, or institutional racism. When the charge of racial exploitation produced by
the application of the amateur/education model to revenue sports is raised, it is
the latter concept of discrimination that a person is asserting. But, once the focus
is on discriminatory effect, the question is not limited to the impact on a few elite
athletes playing revenue sports. Rather, in order to determine if the application
of the amateur/education model has a discriminatory effect, we must consider its
impact on the entire Black Community.
Ultimately, this article aims to redevelop the discussion about whether the
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amateur/education model applied to the revenue sports is racially exploitive
by focusing on the interest of the entire Black Community. If we see the issue
of racial exploitation in terms of the entire Black Community, then potential
solutions to the current dilemma are not so limited. To counteract the notion that
the amateur/education model is potentially racially exploitive, the NCAA and
its member institutions could institute and fund programs that would increase
the college attendance and graduation rates for all blacks. The programs that
the NCAA and its member institutions could institute or fund can help not only
blacks who are currently on the campuses of Division I schools, but also assist
students in predominately black school districts throughout the country. These
programs for high school and junior high schools students could include provid-
ing these students with access to college counselors and financial aid experts,
SAT and ACT preparation courses, tutors in math and science, and establishing
college mentor programs.
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